

The challenges of stateless nation-building. Comparing the paths of ERC and the PNV (1930-1939)

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When comparing Basque and Catalan nationalism, research has often focused the very visible ideological and political differences between the two movements. This paper puts forward an alternative perspective, grounded in the comparative analysis of the discourse produced by the *Catalan Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya* (ERC) and the *Partido Nacionalista Vasco* (PNV) during the 1930s. Its main argument is that these two parties led parallel and essentially similar nation-building processes directly linked to the achievement of home rule and the establishment of national institutions. The article also addresses how these processes were affected by the different Basque and Catalan political contexts, and by the final challenge posed by the Spanish Civil War.

Keywords: nation-building, hegemony, nationalism, Catalonia, Basque Country.

Introduction

Research often looks at stateless nationalist movements with a focus on their particularities. A common approach is to map the visible differences between two or more movements and then proceed to offer

explanations for these. This paper presents an alternative use of the comparative method, which instead brings the search for patterns of similarity to the centre stage. It revolves around the concrete cases represented by the *Partido Nacionalista Vasco* (PNV), and *Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya* (ERC), during the Second Spanish Republic and the subsequent Civil War. These two political parties were the dominant actors within the Basque and Catalan nationalist movements, respectively.¹ Given their shared characteristics – both emerged at the end of the nineteenth century, both claim to represent nations within the borders of the Spanish and French states – these two movements are particularly prone to compared studies. However, they have often been perceived as being fundamentally different from each other, and some past studies have virtually revolved around explaining such differences.² This paper argues that, specifically during the years between 1930 and 1939, ERC and the PNV essentially led two parallel paths towards Basque and Catalan alternative nation-building – i.e. two alternatives to the official Spanish state’s nation-building.

The Czech historian Miroslav Hroch defined national movements as a particular path towards nation-building which is initiated not by a state, but within a ‘non-dominant ethnic group’:

‘[...] nation-building within these ethnic groups assumed the form of national movements seeking to attain all the essential attributes of a distinct nation – i.e. to develop a complete social structure with its own business and academic elites, create a national culture in its national language, and gain a political voice, although not necessarily as a state.’³

Hroch also developed a well-known sequence to monitor the development of national movements. It distinguished an initial phase A, in which small groups of intellectuals tasked themselves with a cultural assertion of the nation. This was followed by a phase B, in which political

activists promoting political demands took the lead. Finally, a phase C would be reached once the nationalist groups were able to appeal to a significant portion of the population, becoming a mass movement.⁴ Later scholars have further developed Hroch's schema. Terry Martin, Tomasz Kamusella, and John Coakley all propose an additional phase D, termed 'national consolidation' by the latter author. This stage involves the national movement gaining access to some form of state power from which it is able to carry out its own institutional nation-building.⁵

This is precisely what Basque and Catalan nationalists achieved during the time period 1930-1939, which saw both obtaining home rule within the legal and political framework of the Second Spanish Republic. The creation of Basque and Catalan self-governing – albeit not sovereign – institutions meant both national movements could dispose of new tools which could potentially allow a qualitative leap in nation-building. It is therefore reasonable to approach a comparative study of Basque and Catalan nationalist movements during this period as the development of two parallel paths towards the national consolidation phase D in their respective nation-building processes. This paper focuses on ERC and the PNV – although both Basque and Catalan nationalism were complex realities with their own internal ideological cleavages – as the agents actually leading these attempted transitions from phase C to D.

Political hegemony and nation-building

ERC and the PNV, despite their different ideological traditions, strategies, and political circumstances, were equally bent on achieving home rule. They both wanted to obtain as much self-government as possible, but also maintained a *realpolitik* outlook, adapting to the changing Spanish political climate. The Second Spanish Republic had been born from the collapse of Primo de Rivera's dictatorship, a regime that had begun in

1923 with a Crown-supported military coup. A republican victory in the state-wide local election of the 12 April 1931 prompted a wave of republican proclamations two days later and the exile of King Alfonso XIII. In that early context, for both the PNV and ERC, self-government initially meant the parallel creation of Basque and Catalan republics, implying some kind of confederate framework for the Spanish state.⁶ When this possibility dissipated, the two parties took up the task of securing self-government by means of an *Estatuto* – a home rule charter. During the summer and autumn months of 1931, the PNV and ERC put forward proposals for *Estatutos* which were both grounded in the concept of Basque and Catalan sovereignty and still hoped – rather wishfully – for some form of federal Spanish political arrangement.⁷ When this was made impossible by the new republican constitution, passed in December 1931, the PNV and ERC toned down their demands. The *Estatutos* that were finally enacted – which was in September 1932 for the Catalan home rule charter, and October 1936 for its Basque counterpart – had moved from sovereignty to ‘regional autonomy’.⁸ So Basque and Catalan nationalists both adjusted their claims to the evolving political opportunistic structure.

Neither ERC nor the PNV planned on struggling for home rule on their own. Both parties directed their efforts through coalitions which involved other political agents. This was in many ways a strategic necessity – the legal process for the approval of an *Estatuto* required a very solid majority⁹ – but it also made sense in terms of nation-building. ERC and the PNV were already mass movements but achieving home rule – moving from phase C to phase D – meant creating institutions that were supposed to represent the sum of the population living in their respective territories. This idea of a ‘nation beyond the nationalists’ was promoted in the political discourse of the two parties. Both the Basque and Catalan *Estatutos* were framed not as the heated claims of determined patriots, but as cross-party efforts responding to the will of

'nations of well-meaning citizens'.¹⁰ This projection of the nationalists' claims to the rest of the nation, which often also involved the blurring of the line between party and people, closely resembles what Michael Billig describes as the 'battle for [national] hegemony, by which a part claims to speak for the whole nation and to represent the national essence.'¹¹ A close analysis of the discourse employed by ERC and the PNV reveals the frequent use of what this author identifies as the syntax and rhetoric of hegemony.¹² These two fragments, published the same day in the context of the 1933 Spanish general election campaign, serve as good examples of this language:

Our candidates are *Euzkadi* and are from *Euzkadi*, and will be for *Euzkadi* and will be because of *Euzkadi*, that is, because of you, their voters, who in being good patriots you are *Euzkadi* herself [...]. Voting for them is voting for *Euzkadi*. Not voting for them is to forsake *Euzkadi*.¹³

Vote for *Esquerra*, men and women of the new Catalonia! Your fatherland wants to live to the rhythm of the free peoples of modern Europe [...]. Let the enterprise that has been started so heroically not be interrupted and maimed by the barbarians, [...] because [...] they are the eternal enemies of our land.¹⁴

In these two texts, limits between party and nation are deliberately blurred. The first is particularly straightforward in portraying both the Basque nationalist voters and the PNV's candidates as a personification of *Euzkadi*, the Basque Country. The second text is a good example of what Billig describes as 'double representation', representing the nation as in describing its alleged will – 'to live to the rhythm of the free peoples of modern Europe' – and as in the party and its actions – the 'heroic enterprise' – standing for the nation.¹⁵

In both cases, advances towards home rule went hand in hand with ERC and the PNV assuming a leading role within their particular political contexts. ERC was quick to do this, thanks to its surprisingly good result in the local election of April 12, which in turn enabled it to play a leading role in the republican proclamations of April 14. Its leader Francesc Macià seized the initiative and proclaimed a 'Catalan Republic' – for which it formed a Provisional Government led by himself – in Barcelona. Three days later, negotiations with the new Spanish executive ended with the reconversion of the Catalan Republic into the *Generalitat*, a provisional institution for Catalan self-government pending the approval of a Catalan *Estatuto*. This effectively placed ERC at the centre of the Catalan political arena, in a position of 'political hegemony', although it struggled initially to integrate its main rival, the conservative Catalan nationalist *Lliga Regionalista* into the new system.¹⁶ The PNV would reach a similar position, also parallel to the achievement of home rule, but it had to wait until 1936, after the outbreak of the Spanish Civil War. Following the approval of the Basque *Estatuto* in October of that year, the PNV leader José Antonio Aguirre became the first *Lehendakari*, or Basque President. His party assumed key positions in the new Basque government, which included posts held by socialist and communist formal rivals.¹⁷

All in all, despite taking place in two different political contexts – the early days of the Second Spanish Republic *versus* the initial phase of the Spanish Civil War – both ERC and the PNV led processes which combined the achievement of both political hegemony and national self-government. By October 1936 two self-ruling institutions – the Basque government and the Catalan *Generalitat* – were in existence, with attributes often associated with sovereign states: a national flag, a national capital, and a national language which had to be protected and promoted. ERC and the PNV played a central role within these institutions, but they also had the support of other political actors.

Symbolic and political frames which had previously only existed as part of the Basque and Catalan nationalist programmes, were now material and institutional realities.¹⁸

Different contexts, different challenges

The aforementioned arguments must be reconciled with the fact that the practical aspects of Basque and Catalan nationalist politics between 1931 and 1939 were often markedly different. This does not invalidate the idea that ERC and the PNV were engaging in essentially similar processes in terms of nation-building. It simply underlines that these processes were very similar in their substance yet different in their practical materialisation, in terms of both form and timing. More insight into why this was the case can be gained by applying the conceptual framework proposed by Charles Tilly and Sidney Tarrow in their mechanism-process approach to contentious politics.¹⁹ This methodology involves the analysis of the political actors making claims, their relationship with the existing regime(s), and the relevant political identities at work, in order to explain the roles and actions of particular players.

The PNV was the leading political actor within Basque nationalism after its reformation in 1930, when two factions created by a previous split in 1921 agreed to reunify. Founded by Sabino and Luis Arana in 1895, the PNV came from an integralist Catholic political tradition, and it was positioned to the right of the political spectrum. Those who had wished to move the party towards a more liberal progressive position left to create *Acción Nacionalista Vasca* (ANV) in 1930.²⁰ In the years preceding the start of the Spanish Civil War however, the PNV would gradually transition to a more centre-right, Christian democratic stance, influenced by leaders such as José Antonio Aguirre and Manuel Irujo. The dominant

Catalan nationalist player emerged in 1931 as *Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya* (ERC). Unambiguously to the left of the political spectrum, ERC was grounded in a convergence of the Catalan republican and nationalist traditions. Its leaders included Francesc Macià, an ex-Colonel in the Spanish army and founder of the pro-independence party *Estat Català*, who had become a symbol of resistance to Primo de Rivera's dictatorship during the previous decade. Another key figure was Lluís Companys, a labour lawyer on good terms with the anarcho-syndicalist union CNT and with a long history in republican activism.

These two different ideological backgrounds would have direct impact on the two agents' relationship with the new regime. On the one hand, ERC became what Tilly and Tarrow describe as a 'regime member', i.e. a political actor with a 'secure standing in day-to-day politics'. Conversely, the PNV soon adopted the role of 'regime challenger', still influential but not on very good terms with the ruling actors.²¹ ERC was bound by a strategic agreement with the Spanish republican left. Its founders had taken part in the *Pacto de San Sebastián*, an alliance brokered in August 1930 which included Spanish republican parties and the socialist PSOE to bring down Primo de Rivera's dictatorship. When this alliance triumphed after the 14 April 1931 proclamations, ERC naturally assumed a position of closeness with the new regime led by President Niceto Alcalá-Zamora. The PNV, on the other hand, was absent from the San Sebastian pact, as it prioritized its party reunification process. Moreover, it had little sympathy for the now ruling Spanish left, which had been its historical rival (the PSOE in particular), given its strength in the Basque industrial areas of Biscay and Gipuzkoa.

Besides their different relationships with the republican regime, ERC and the PNV had to deal with different balances of power within their respective political contexts. Basque nationalism, after its emergence in the late-nineteenth century, had developed unequally through the Basque territory. It was dominant in the rural areas of Biscay and

Gipuzkoa, less so in the more urban and industrial parts of these two provinces, and quite weak in the Carlist-dominated Araba and Navarre. In absolute terms, the Basque political arena was similar to 'an almost equilateral political triangle', drawn between the PNV, the socialist and republican parties, and the monarchist right which included the Carlists.²² Catalan nationalism was much more evenly distributed throughout Catalonia, its four provinces falling under the shadow of Barcelona's specific economic, political and cultural weight. Of the three forces that can be considered to form the Catalan political triangle, two – ERC and its conservative rival, the *Lliga Regionalista* – can be described as Catalan nationalist. The third key player was the anarcho-sindicalist union CNT, which mostly stayed out from institutional politics.²³

The regime member *versus* challenger situation between ERC and the PNV created a strategic barrier which had profound effects. During the summer and autumn months of 1931, the new Republic was engaged in a process to draft its constitution. In this context, both the PNV and ERC were pressing to secure home rule by means of an *Estatuto*. ERC mustered support from different corners of the political spectrum, but its winning card was again maintaining a good relationship with the Spanish republican left, which would prove ultimately decisive in the final approval of the Catalan *Estatuto* in September 1932. The PNV, on the other hand, turned to some of the regime's worst enemies for help: the Carlist monarchists, with whom it formed a coalition for the June 1931 general election. Madrid was unwilling to allow a quick implementation of Basque home rule, not even in provisional terms as it had allowed in Catalonia, fearing a Basque self-governing institution would fall into the hands of the Basque nationalist-Carlist coalition.²⁴

In terms of political identities, a major factor behind the different politics of ERC and the PNV was the religious question. True to its leftist republican tradition, ERC was an enthusiastic supporter of the new regime's secularisation policies. The PNV, on the other hand,

represented the opposition by many Basque Catholics to diminish the Catholic Church's social and political influence. Its stance on religion was one of the reasons why it was able to join forces with the Carlists in 1931. In fact, their joint proposal for a Basque *Estatuto* was framed in religious terms and even included a provision for a separate Basque concordat with the Vatican. The idea, dubbed 'a vaticanist Gibraltar' by the Basque PSOE leader Indalecio Prieto, was to revolt to the Spanish left and to the provisional executive in Madrid. The religious question was particularly damaging to the relations between ERC and the PNV. As tension rose, many in the former saw the latter as backward 'troglodytes' clinging to oppressive traditionalist principles. Meanwhile, the PNV's press would often depict ERC as furiously anticlerical and 'sectarian'.²⁵

With the leftist defeat in the Spanish 1933 general election came the end of ERC's status as a regime member and the gradual erosion of the strategic barrier with the PNV. This brought the two parties closer together, which did not prevent them from continuing to make different strategic and tactical decisions over the next years. In October 1934, the PSOE and other leftist agents led an insurrection against the Spanish government, after Alejandro Lerroux's Radical Party formed an executive which included ministers from the authoritarian right-wing *Confederación Española de Derechas Autónomas* (CEDA). ERC joined in from its position of institutional power in Catalonia. Lluís Companys proclaimed a 'Catalan State of the Spanish Federal Republic' before the rising was crushed by the Spanish army. Meanwhile, the PNV remained passive and, beyond some local-level incidents, had nothing to do with the insurrection. Its position on the political spectrum meant the Basque nationalist party could not lend its support to a rebellion that was being spearheaded by socialists and communists demanding radical social change. In February 1936, ERC and the PNV also took different positions with regards to the general election. The former enthusiastically sided with the broad alliance formed by the Spanish left, the Popular Front,

represented in Catalonia by the *Front d'esquerres*. The latter fielded its own candidates despite the growing left-right polarisation that would eventually give rise to the Spanish Civil War.

The Spanish Civil War and the limits of Basque and Catalan nation-building

The circumstances created by the outbreak of the Spanish Civil War allowed a series of developments which can be seen as a continuation of the pattern described above. On the one hand, the conflict represented an unprecedented opportunity for Basque and Catalan nation-building. The initial chaos caused by the fighting and Madrid's initial erratic response to the rising of the colonial Army of Africa in July 1936 severely reduced the republican government's capacity to exercise firm control over its territory. This meant that Catalan and Basque self-government, which *de jure* was significantly limited, became *de facto* almost of a state-like nature. Both the *Generalitat* and the new Basque government assumed power attributions that went well beyond the limits established by their respective *Estatutos*. With the ability to exercise control over military units, justice systems, currency and foreign relations, the potential for a full transition from phase C to D in terms of nation-building was very real.

On the other hand, the war also posed enormous challenges. This was true for both cases, although once again the particularities of each context determined each specific picture. In Catalonia, perhaps the greatest challenge was the fact that in the aftermath of the defeated military coup, armed worker's militias had effectively seized control. The *Generalitat* slowly reversed this power-duality situation during the autumn of 1936, but the revolutionaries, particularly the CNT, retained a significant degree of power until May 1937. In the Basque Country,

Aguirre's government's main handicap was that most of the Basque territory had actually been taken over by Franco's advancing armies. This included the whole province of Navarre, as well as the vast majority of Gipuzkoa and Araba. The remaining territory under the Basque government's control was part of a larger republican pocket which included Cantabria and Asturias. This isolation, which enabled the Basque government to operate with little interference from the central republican executive, also created a dangerous military situation.

Perhaps the epitome of how the war could create combinations of opportunities and challenges for Basque and Catalan nation-building was the actual military dimension of the conflict. Eugene Weber showed the crucial role played by mass military service in French nation-building.²⁶ Surely, mass conscription under the banners of the Basque and Catalan governments would have had a large potential for nation-building. In practice, however, this faced several complications. For a significant portion of the conflict, military units were openly party or union based and made up of volunteers, and only Basque or Catalan nationalist units had what can be described as a Basque or Catalan 'nationalising climate'. It is difficult to measure the 'nation-building effectiveness' of both cases, but existing studies show that Basque nationalist units were more effective in this endeavour than their Catalan nationalist counterparts.²⁷

This high-water mark in Basque and Catalan self-government was short-lived. In neither case did it manage to survive the spring of 1937. The March 31 rebel general Emilio Mola began an offensive which, despite strong Basque resistance, managed to take Bilbao on June 19. The Basque government was forced into exile, relocating to Barcelona via France. Beginning in May, the republican government under Juan Negrín began to take steps to erode Catalan home rule. Catalan military units – included those created by Catalan nationalists – were integrated into the centralised *Ejército Popular Republicano*. After November, the Spanish

republican cabinet moved to Barcelona, where it took over many of the *Generalitat's* functions, including war industries, supplies, and foreign trade.

Franco's final victory over Catalonia in January 1939, which resulted in the Basque and Catalan presidents crossing the border with France together, was a hard blow to both nationalist movements' nation building processes. Under the Francoist 'New Spain', phase D was unattainable, and both movements were forced to an underground version of phase C.

All in all, the particular approach outlined in this paper shows that the political paths of ERC and the PNV during the 1930s can be viewed, not in the light of the two parties' many ideological differences, but as leading agents in parallel nation-building processes. This perspective brings some more light to transition from phase C to D in cases in which national self-ruling institutions are achieved, but are not sovereign. The cases of ERC and the PNV during the Second Spanish Republic clearly show how home rule, despite providing a significant qualitative leap in nation-building, came with its own challenges and remained contentious up to its complete reversal in 1939

Endnotes

¹ For the most complete study available for ERC during the Second Spanish Republic see M.D. Ivern i Salvà, *Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya (1931-1936)* (Barcelona, 1988) 1 & 2 vols. Another key reference is J.B. Culla, *Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya, 1931-2012: una història política* (Barcelona, 2013). On the PNV, see S. de Pablo, L. Mees & J.A. Rodríguez Ranz, *El Péndulo Patriótico* (Barcelona, 1999 & 2001) 1 & 2 vols. On the PNV's internal organisation and support base during the Second Spanish Republic, see J.M. Tápiz Fernández, *El*

PNV durante la II República (organización interna, implantación territorial y bases sociales) (Bilbao 2001).

² The impact of comparative research on Basque and Catalan nationalism has been quite limited considering the relative popularity of both movements as individual objects of study. Sociology, rather than historiography, has produced the two complete comparative studies available to date: J. Díez Medrano, *Divided nations: Class, Politics and Nationalism in the Basque Country and Catalonia* (Ithaca, 1995); D. Conversi, *The Basques, the Catalans, and Spain: Alternative Routes to Nationalist Mobilisation* (London, 1997). This is not to say that historians of Basque and Catalan nationalism have ignored the comparative perspective, but within historiography comparison has been often limited to very specific issues or remained a secondary feature within wider pieces of research. Díez Medrano's aforementioned work can be seen as an example of the 'difference hypothesis' approach, influenced by the earlier Elorza, 'Ideología Nacionalista y Antiguo Régimen: elementos para una comparación', in: *Industrialización y Nacionalismo: Análisis Comparativo. Actas del I Coloquio Vasco-Catalán de Historia*, (1985), 401-413.

³ M. Hroch, *European Nations. Explaining their Formation* (New York, 2015), 31.

⁴ M. Hroch, *Social preconditions of national revival in Europe: a comparative analysis of the Social Composition of Patriotic Groups among the Smaller European Nations* (New York, 2000).

⁵ Maxwell, 'Typologies and phases in nationalism studies: Hroch's A-B-C schema as a basis for comparative terminology', in: *Nationalities Papers*, 38/6 (2010), 871; J. Coakley, *Nationalism, Ethnicity and the State: Making and Breaking Nations* (London, 2012), 194, 214.

⁶ The Catalan Republic was proclaimed by Francesc Macià on 14 April 1931, partly as a reaction to the spreading wave of generic – i.e. Spanish – republican proclamations, including an earlier proclamation in Barcelona by Lluís Companys. Macià formed a provisional executive and a 'civic guard' to further assert his position. Madrid decided on a negotiated deactivation of the Catalan Republic, given Macià's prestige and position of relative strength, as well as his leftist sympathies with the Spanish Republican cause. See Ivern i Salvà, *Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya*, vol. 1, 99-100. On the other hand, the Basque Republic was never proclaimed as such, although the concept was included in an official note read by the newly elected Basque nationalist representatives. When the

PNV tried to move on to something more serious by calling for an assembly of Basque town councillors in Gernika, the Spanish Government sent the army and aborted the meeting. See de Pablo e.a., *El Péndulo Patriótico*, vol. 1, 211; 'Lo ocurrido en Gernika', in: *Euzkadi* (18-4-1931).

⁷ The initial proposals for a Basque and Catalan *Estatutos* made in the summer of 1931 were known by names of the towns that had played a key role in their creation, Estella and Núrria respectively. Both contained assertions of Basque and Catalan sovereignty but differed greatly in other key aspects. The Catalan Núrria text was much more in line with the republican and secularist spirit of the new Spanish regime, while the Basque Estella proposal showed clear influences from corporatism and traditionalism. See X. Bernadí Gil, *El Traspàs de Serveis de l'Estat a la Genrealitat: de l'Estatut de 1932 a l'Estatut de 2006* (Barcelona, 2010), 45-52; 'El Proyecto de Estatuto Vasco', in: *Euzkadi* (17-6-1931).

⁸ The 1931 Spanish Constitution defined Spain as a *estado integral*, an ambiguous term which was meant to allow administrative decentralisation without adopting the federal formula and safeguarding Spanish national sovereignty. The Catalan *Estatuto* that was finally passed by the Spanish Parliament, or *Cortes*, in September 1932 was a heavily modified version of the Núrria text. See Bernadí Gil, *El Traspàs de Serveis de l'Estat a la Generalitat*, 53-58. The Basque Estella *Estatuto* was discarded after the approval of the republican Constitution in December 1931. Later proposals failed to progress because of the continued animosity between the PNV and the Spanish left, and after November 1933, because of the opposition of the Spanish political right. See *Proyecto de Estatuto del País Vasco-Navarro* (Bilbao, 1932). Navarre was included in the initial *Estatuto* texts, but the province abandoned the project in 1933 following the combined rejection of the Carlists and some leftists. See de J.L. la Granja, *Nacionalismo y II República en el País Vasco* (Madrid, 2008), 298-304. The Basque *Estatuto* that was finally enacted in October 1936 was essentially a copy of its Catalan counterpart. It was meant *de jure* for the provinces of Araba, Gipuzkoa and Biscay, although only applied *de facto* to the former. See *Gaceta de Madrid* (7-10-1936).

⁹ The 1931 Spanish Constitution established that, before being taken to Parliament, an *Estatuto* needed the support of the majority of municipalities within the region it sought to represent and a favourable plebiscite of at least two thirds of the electoral census. See *Gaceta de Madrid* (9-12-1931).

¹⁰ *La Rambla* (18-5-1931); *Euzkadi* (21-5-1931).

¹¹ M. Billig, *Banal nationalism* (London 1995), 27.

¹² Billig, *Banal nationalism*, 88.

¹³ *Euzkadi* (19-11-1933).

¹⁴ *Esquerra* (19-11-1933).

¹⁵ Billig, *Banal nationalism*, 98.

¹⁶ A. Sallés, *Quan Catalunya era d'Esquerra* (Barcelona, 1981).

¹⁷ J.L. de la Granja, *El Oasis Vasco* (Madrid, 2007), 383-384.

¹⁸ It is important to note that two of the most important Basque nationalist symbols that became institutionalised in 1936 – the Basque nationalist's name for the Basque Country, *Euzkadi*, and the Basque nationalist *ikurriña* flag – had only been created by the Arana brothers at the end of the nineteenth century. For decades, these symbols had remained associated exclusively to the PNV and the Basque nationalist community, so their adoption by the Basque government in 1936 was a rather dramatic change. See Casquete & de la Granja, 'Ikurriña', in: *Diccionario Ilustrado de Símbolos del Nacionalismo Vasco* (Madrid, 2012), 508-516; L. Mees, 'Euskadi/Euskal Herria' in: *Diccionario Ilustrado de Símbolos del Nacionalismo Vasco* (Madrid, 2012), 294-319. On the other hand, the term *Catalunya* and the Catalan *senyera* flag had a previous tradition of both institutional and popular use that could be traced back to the Middle Ages, so they were not exclusively associated to Catalan nationalism. See P. Anguera, *Les Quatre Barres: De Bandera Històrica a Senyera Nacional* (Barcelona, 2010).

¹⁹ C. Tilly, & S. Tarrow, *Contentious Politics* (Oxford 2015). For a recent application of the 'contentious politics' concept to the case of Basque nationalism and the Basque conflict, see L. Mees, *The Basque Contention* (New York, 2020).

²⁰ For the most comprehensive study on ANV to date see de la Granja, *Nacionalismo y II República en el País Vasco*.

²¹ Tilly e.a., *Contentious Politics*, 240.

²² De la Granja, *Nacionalismo y II República en el País Vasco*, 607-608.

²³ I. Molas, *El sistema de partidos políticos en Cataluña (1931-1939)* (Barcelona, 1974), 19-21.

²⁴ A lucid perspective on the apparent inability of the PNV to grasp the reality of the political situation – and why its claims for self-government were not treated in the same way as those of Catalan nationalists – can be found in Sallés, Ucelay Da Cal, 'L'analogia falsa: el Nacionalisme Basc davant de la República Catalana i la Generalitat Provisional, abril-juliol del 1931', in: *Industrialización y Nacionalismo: Análisis Comparativo. Actas del I Coloquio Vasco-Catalán de Historia*, (1985) 443-470.

²⁵ *La Rambla* (31-8-1931); *Euzkadi* (18-10-1931).

²⁶ E. Weber, *Peasants into Frenchmen. The modernisation of rural France, 1870-1914* (Palo Alto, 1976).

²⁷ X.M. Núñez Seixas, *¡Fuera el invasor! Nacionalismos y movilización bélica durante la Guerra Civil española (1936-1939)* (Madrid, 2006).