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**HISTORY, HISTORIOGRAPHY AND THE AMBIGUITIES OF CATALAN NATIONALISM**

This essay shall attempt to address some of the major difficulties encountered in the study of nationalism, with attention focused on Catalan nationalism and Catalan history.\(^1\) Precisely because the stress of the interpretation is on ambiguity, this article will use the most ambiguous (if also most common) Catalan term for patriotic or nationalist feelings: *catalanisme* or, literally, ‘Catalanism’. Both the questions and interpretation presented here are idiosyncratic, rather than representative, given that the author, who, not being a Catalan nor being a convert to the premises of *catalanisme*, has criteria regarding Catalan nationalism which are not shared by much of the profession in Catalonia, which is indeed partial, if not militant, in its feelings. Nor, it should be added, does he feel any particular regard for the often gratuitous suppositions of Spanish nationalist historians, who are increasing in presence and noise.

Can a historian narrate a nationalist movement over time, and in context, without taking sides, without being influenced by the special pleading that all nationalisms, indeed, all social movements, invoke to buttress their case? Can the historian be without compassion, and not respond to the victimised nature of a ‘losing’, that is stateless, nationalism? Can the studious analyst avoid the implicit assumptions hidden in a field, say Hispanism or Hispanic studies, dedicated to the Spanish language and its culture, which is cluttered with doubtful suppositions? Is it even possible...
to write the history of a territory without making nationalist assumptions? Is it possible to write the history of say, France, without the faith that such an entity, teleologically and praeternaturally, exists? That it is not quite there, not quite real, that it will be, and so it does not really make any difference? Can we create a coherent narrative, an explanation that is understandable without professional jargon or academic gobbledygook by an ‘ordinary reader’, even if presumably an intelligent one?

Such reflections are necessary when writing about a country that literally does not ‘exist’. Except as an autonomous region of the recognised nation state Spain, Catalonia cannot obtain political recognition today. There is a solid nationalist historiography of Spain. And it is confronted by perhaps an even more solid nationalist historiography of Catalonia as a nation, even as a medieval ‘nation state’, over a millennium. Hence my question: how can I narrate Catalan history without nineteenth-century teleological assumptions about the future reality of Catalonia? I am very skeptical of the assumptions generally used by historians. Notwithstanding the ongoing betterment of investigative tools, history as a discipline remains extremely conservative in its conceptual foundations. Elsewhere, I have repeatedly called for a ‘nihilistic’ analysis, that is, not taking for granted the suppositions that we, as historians, habitually assume, so as to comfortably go about our business of writing research monographs and not essays in the philosophy of history (in my experience at least, a field most working historians disdain). This would, however, be most welcome, considering the high empirical cost of all efforts at narration, at readability and ease of understanding. Dealing with nationalism has hidden costs that any scholar should be aware of.

These are all serious impediments to effective comparative work in the study of nationalisms. Comparative literature dates back to the origins of Romanticism, whereas comparative study in jurisprudence is even older – the nineteenth century much enjoyed the comparison of constitutional law, and, by extension, specific institutions of government. But just how valid are comparisons regarding political movements? Inquiry on the ‘working-class movement’ always could rely on the thread of ideology, especially among neo-Marxists, but the chaos that still surrounds the definition of concepts like fascism or populism indicates just how difficult
comparisons can be. Sadly, there is no set of common givens, no cosy axioms for investigators in the field of nationalism. True, we have gone from a dearth of theoretical orientation to what can only be termed overabundance. The weight of classic social history (basically dedicated to the exclusive study of the working-class movement) was brought over and adapted, often crudely, to the taxonomy of nationalism. Such conceptual riches, by their sheer weight have tended to compress, even crush, the traditional running debate in the field between those who understood nationalism as a social trend which transcended chronological history and those who saw it as an exclusive expression of modernity with a starting-point somewhere in the European seventeenth-eighteenth century. The wealth of criteria in circulation, the potential hook-ups with parallel disciplines beyond political sociology, such as social psychology or cultural anthropology, have failed to produce any impressive conceptual consensus, and both analytical and empirical knowledge has tended to accumulate, trapped in academic circles of debate in a world in which universities are increasingly less relevant, right up to the present day. Why?

Scholars of nationalism may possess knowledge and experience in the study of several societies in interaction, but not of a vast number of case studies. Of course, all of these latter should be understood with similar degrees of sophistication regarding cultural trends, leading figures in literature and the arts in multiple rival languages, as well as the philological distinctions that accompany creative products of all kinds, and the conceptual nuances that classify apparently similar but rival political parties in differing political systems, and are also endowed with the capacity to distinguish between electoral-parliamentary organisations and the partisans of ‘armed struggle’, and so on and so forth. The sheer professional demands become impossible.

In other words, to explain how a nationalism has developed, one must also clarify the overall historical trends of the territory that nationalism claims as its own, and, in addition, those neighbouring places where such hegemony would be clearly disputed. To elucidate the conceptualisation of a nationalism, therefore, is to have to simultaneously narrate and describe its development. This signifies a built-in bias, necessary for reasons of
literary sequentaility: explanations of nationalism tend towards unconscious nationalism, simply by the narrative isolation of the focus. It shall be to this politicising aspect that my article, combining the pattern of Catalan nationalist self-contemplation and the development of Spain/Catalonia (including France/Catalonia and even Italy/Catalonia). What happens to historical perception when a crushing majority of historians are engaged, fully armed and combative for a cause that is ideologically indistinguishable from its historiography? This essay will attempt to deal with this open question, applying it to the practice of Catalan historiography and its confusion and/or interaction with Catalan nationalism in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, up to the present.5

The implicit perceptions of Catalanism

Like so many other analogous movements that coincided with the impact of Romanticism, Catalan nationalism has consistently exhibited an intense preoccupation with the monopolistic possession of historical ‘truth’. Such a clear preoccupation, however, does not mean a rich tradition of internal debate, between factions, such as liberals and clericals, but rather an overwhelming tendency towards synthesis, that is the accretion of elements, however contradictory, into a single narrative, an ongoing and working consensus which could be accepted by both left and right. The dominance of such a synthetic consensus has meant that Catalan historiography has exhibited certain clear traits over time. These, basically, can be summed up as structural ambiguity and, simultaneously, the insistence on internal consistency. As is logical, most, if not all, of the problems in Catalan historiography derive from very fundamental aspects of Catalan politics in the last two hundred or so years. The key concept that has dominated what often has been termed ‘identity politics’ in Catalonia (as opposed to ‘the politics of class’) since 1886 is the term catalanisme, from the title of a major political essay by an ex-federal republican political leader, Valentí Almirall (1841-1904).6 By writing Lo catalanisme, Almirall attempted to move from the left to the centre, and thereby abandon the more theoretical trend of Catalan and/or Spanish
federalism, led by Francisco Pi Margall (1824-1901), an ideological evolution that had its own structural problems. But just what exactly is Catalanism? The calculated vagueness of Catalanism as a concept is hard to explain to those that do not share the common bonding of a small society. Catalanism takes for granted the almost exclusive use of the Catalan language for all activities, from publishing scientific research to buying bread. Beyond linguistic affirmation, it means a sense of patriotism that is intense enough to dominate other areas of political identification (social, religious, even formal party affiliation), but which does not define itself. Thus Catalanism can be ‘nationalist’, even ‘separatist’ (the preferred term for radical nationalists from about 1900 to 1968), starkly ‘independentist’ (the approved term for militants after 1968), but also simply ‘autonomist’ or even ‘federalist’. It was and remains an ‘insider’ concept, which derives its deepest meaning from the distrust of the ‘outsider’, understood as all those who do not understand Catalan. So as to make internal, even unspoken, characteristics comprehensible to a foreign audience it is necessary to give some general information, condensed and compacted, to establish a frame of reference that can be shared. Otherwise any explanation offered is closed, covered with a cloak of ‘expertise’ and specificity, paradoxically rendered invisible precisely by all its detail.

It is customary for Catalan nationalists, historians or not, to allude – even to take for granted – what is called in Catalan el fet diferencial, literally ‘the differential fact’ or the specific character of Catalan society, its distinct patterns of behaviour which traditionally have been held to be markedly different from those of the rest of Spain. Put in organisational terms, Catalonia had not enjoyed the alleged taste of statehood since the fifteenth century, but it had a unique civil society, a network of professional and craft associations that, by clever adaptation, more or less survived the suppression of guilds by the liberal revolution of the 1830s. Thus Catalan traditional law gave women the rights of property, Catalans knew all about contracts and litigation, and, more important, were used to being led by lawyers and physicians, with an occasional merchant, rather than by soldiers with imposing titles. The only problem was the delicate matter of full access: just who was recognised as a party of the first part in the full
play of civil society? The ideal of the family business was evident in what amounted to a ‘society of families’, in which interlocked networks of cousins (it was common, for example, for two brothers to marry two sisters) could rely upon close ties to guarantee loans. Joint stocks were not needed for small factories or for shipping and shipbuilding, and banks were only a medium for family links and family money, but a theatre or an opera house could be ‘shared’ in common.

The Catalan ‘society of families’, in my understanding, functioned as a semipermeable network in which all those who possess local knowledge can pinpoint everybody else by family relation; the network was traditionally reinforced by intermarriage, school ties, friendships and business partnerships, and outsiders could only have access through a ‘mixed marriage’. The extensive intimate use of Catalan, and the fact of being bilingual, handily kept out immigrant upstarts. The popular urban classes were also excluded from recognition if someone rose quickly to become a nouveau riche, again unless he could insert himself effectively in the invisible network. The countryside was stable with an extremely traditional and conservative system of tenancy, based above all on vineyards, with contracts that could last for centuries, at least until the Phylloxera, an initially uncontrollable phytoparasite, arrived in Catalonia at the beginning of the 1880s. This change brought turmoil to Catalan agrarian life until the end of the Civil War of 1936-1939. Until the early 1980s, Catalan peasants did not really face outside immigration on their own turf, and up to then had competed with migratory waves for primacy in internal space, Catalan rural family to the big city, encouraged by a Catalan legal system based on rigid primogeniture in inheritance.

With the boom that accompanied the First World War (Spain was the only neutral territory, untouched physically by the conflict, in the entire Mediterranean basin), came so-called murcianos from Southern Spain. Immigration peaked after about 1920, and became a source of working-class protest up to the social revolution of 1936-1937 in Catalonia, during the Civil War. The Franco victory brought functionaries and political personnel from Central Spain, highly ideologised in small-town, agrarian Catholic values, and hostile to big city corruption and ‘foreign-ness’. Although irritating in the extreme, the numbers of such franquistas were
not really demographic in scale. The ‘problem’ of being swamped by outsiders with high birth rates did not present itself again for Catalanists until about 1960, when the Andalusian countryside was rapidly depopulated of its agrarian proletariat, which fled obsolescence, with the motorisation of agrarian fieldwork, to industrial or service jobs in the Spanish metropolitan centres, Madrid and Barcelona, as well as going further away to France, Belgium, Switzerland and Germany. The newcomers to Barcelona were objectively treated like *Gastarbeiter* in their own country of Spain, and so tension was real, even if latent given the ideological mood of the Franco regime. All this, as we shall see further on, changed radically during the construction boom of the late 1990s and the beginning of the twenty-first century.\(^{11}\)

Thus, leisure or cultural consumption served as model for social organisation beyond the family, reaching out to politics. But, in a world of connected individuals and families, was a union of workingmen a recognisable entity to be incorporated into the interplay of civil society, or, on the contrary, was it a sinister defiance of all the rules which were held dear and which kept things working together? Most of Spain was forged in the ideal of centralised government, even to the degree of *estadolatría*, the Spanish term for idolatrous worship of the state. This was a potential theological worry to Papist churchmen and theologians, not bruited about until nineteenth-century liberalism: the ample and systematic use of expropriation of land and real estate, made the Church pay the cost of the social change from collective, ‘feudal’ notions of property to those juridical concepts that made working capitalism possible. Catalonia was quite the opposite. Catalans, to be sure, idealised the law, but it was civil and mercantile practice that they appreciated, and many ostensibly loathed the model of *raison d’état*.\(^{12}\) Thus Catalonia, as a civil society, was clearly libertarian as regarded behaviour, but not as regarded belief, which was understood to be firmly and enthusiastically Roman Catholic. Individualism in practical, personal or sexual matters was tolerated in the extreme, even valued, but always within the limits of mental orthodoxy. Such a contradictory yet exceptional sense of libertarianism and/or individualism would have important intellectual and social implications in the future.
Thus, the idea of the ‘differential fact’ of a strong civil society, composed of myriad institutions beyond the all-encompassing Catholic Church of the past, was certainly true when Catalanism arose at the end of the nineteenth century, and even at mid-to-late twentieth century, although the rhythm of change was visible. It is no longer true today: Catalans do not have a significantly different work ethic, greater sense of the clock and punctuality, more promptitude and carry-through than most other Spaniards. They do retain, however, a different language, which, as other subtler and more social signs are erased, has become more and more the obsessive reference point of all nationalist longing.

Confused notions of private and public institutions in Catalan society

Despite the tendency of Catalan nationalist historians to stress the ‘Catalan-Aragonese’ nature of the Aragonese crown, there never existed anything that, in late medieval, much less Early Modern times, could be characterised as an embryonic Catalan state, except in the most Romantic and delusionary of ways.13 This, quite obviously, was a most unhappy antecedent for the rise, growth, and development of a nationalist historiography, necessarily bent on justifying the past experience as the teleological ‘prediction’ of future statehood. In the sixteenth century, the emergence of ‘Spain’ encouraged the Catalan aristocracy and upper nobility to intermarry with families from elsewhere, that is in Castile, as a means of obtaining more visibility and better careers, with the result that the lesser nobility and the urban patriciate took upon themselves the defense of local laws, liberties and privileges regarding particulars, either persons, places or institutions, which were a source of intense pride in all the Aragonese crown and which were thought of in Catalonia as the ‘Constitutions’ which vertebrated the country’s institutions.14

In the eighteenth century, the reforming Bourbon administration chose to improve the ramshackle Spanish system along the new French lines, and this meant both the elimination of particularisms and local ‘constitutional
liberties’ of the Aragonese Crownlands in the name of a necessarily militarised ideal of efficiency. As the holdouts against a Bourbon triumph, the Catalans were collectively punished, forbidden the right to bear arms and other less onerous prohibitions, in ways that are markedly reminiscent of the rough methods used by Hannoverian England to put Scotland ‘in order’ after the 1745-1746 Stuart uprising.\(^\text{15}\) In a Catalan context, these events were decried, in the eighteenth century, by austracista exiles in Vienna, who maintained a defense of the old ‘composite monarchy’ and its alleged liberties in a classic ‘lost cause’ format.\(^\text{16}\)

Then, a century later, in the 1830s, at least in a Catalan context, similar ideas were recovered yet again by the new Bourbon ‘Carlists’ who defended the cause of the legitimist pretender Charles V (the ultra-conservative brother of Ferdinand VII, who claimed his Salic law rights to succeed at the king’s death in 1833) and, with him, the primacy of traditional (even pre-Bourbon) institutions. At the same time, Catalan Romantics, who tended to be liberals and anti-Carlists, wrote ideologically loaded historical novels, in the mode established by Sir Walter Scott (1771-1832), about the death of Catalan freedom, be that in 1653 or in 1714. Since, in many cases, like Víctor Balaguer (1824-1901) or Antoni de Bofarull (1821-1892), they were also historians and pioneer Catalanists, these writers established in this fashion a historiographic truism that has lasted up to the present, especially in nationalist literature.\(^\text{17}\) Whatever later nationalists claimed or claim, the results of pacification and forced hispanisation were in many ways strikingly beneficial. The duality of the hardworking merchant, with his moneygrubbing assumptions, and the swaggering bravo, with his sword or pistol, was reduced to the merchant side, without hired guns or swordsmen, a situation, which effectively enforced profit-making.\(^\text{18}\)

In Barcelona, as in Spain as a whole, there was a very humble ‘practical enlightenment’ or ‘enlightenment by association’, marked by a good conversation, good business, and little intellectual ‘stars’, who exchanged timid thoughts about how to best fight obscurantism, and collected books. In a more modest way, las Luces (‘the Lights' in Spanish, Catalan then being an oral idiom) was rather like the urbanised social life of the multitude of
central German states that enjoyed the formation of a functional civil society with the Aufklärung.\textsuperscript{19} So modernity, such as it was, came privately, through the intimacies of commercial correspondence, personal contacts and trust, rather than through the initiatives of the court parties, with their afrancesado (frenchified) pretensions and newfangled ideas of the philosophes read in smuggled books.

**Cumulative ideological assumptions and Catalan truisms**

The civil wars of the fifteenth century (both the struggles surrounding Joan II and social conflict of the peasant remences), the 1640 ‘revolt of the Catalans’ and the dozen year-long incorporation of all Catalonia into the crown of Louis XIII (king of France, 1610-1643) and Louis XIV (reigned 1643-1715), with the loss of transpyrenean Catalan territory in 1659, the constant French military pressures in the second half of the seventeenth century, and, as a climax, the devastating War of Spanish Succession – all these upheavals provided for the cumulative construction of political discourses. They could be plowed under in times of more or less integration under the Spanish crown, but could be recovered, brought up to date, invented and reinvented, interpreted and reinterpreted, as situations of protest required. This was a true political tradition, hidden from Spanish and/or Castilian eyes, in part by language, but especially because it presented an alternative model of construction of a different, more benign and kinder ‘Hispania’, allegedly plural instead of rigid, federal and/or confederal instead of centralising, a hypothetical context in which general policy always would be open to discussion.\textsuperscript{20}

Behind this quite self-congratulatory façade, and the fact of strong local networks of civil society, there remained a fundamental incapacity to establish large-scale consensus across acrimonious cleavages: networking families and friends has necessarily meant, at some point, confronting inherited enmities, as well as mistrusting outsiders (forasters) until they were duly married or bonded into the established groups. The great French scholar of Catalan history, Pierre Vilar (1906-2003) insisted that the tenacious continuity of Catalan society from the fourteenth century
onwards is perhaps its most striking trait. But just what did this continuity consist of? Without a clear local succession in either dynastic terms (if we believe the nationalist historiographic tradition) or in the stable maintenance of a representative ‘constitutional’ practice (another nationalist article of faith), then what was inherited was the accumulation of lessons learnt from a succession of civil wars, all of which produced a most extensive literature, rich in heart-rending arguments and bitter denunciations – a reservoir of political arguments, to be repeated time and time again, right up to the present.

Such societal fantasies reflect what still is today (though much attenuated) the above-mentioned ‘society of families’, in which interlocking kinship patterns have tended to interconnect with family-run businesses in a necessarily small company or small factory system. Capital was raised within the family and interest duly accounted for and paid: as a result Catalan banking has been marked by famous failures, and, in the twentieth century, the great financial success stories were savings-and-loans or local banks. Since the world financial crisis of 2008, however, this picture looks much less bright, since thrift institutions have been largely eliminated.

In a highly centralised political system that tended to circulate functionaries throughout all of Spain – although providing openings in the military, the judiciary, the university – promotion was determined outside Catalonia and was hard to influence or control locally. In reply, the favoured Catalan argument was the creation of a private system of services which, at least ideally, would rival the scant public offerings: if the state administration was carried out in Spanish, as civil society grew and became increasingly aware of its own potential, it tended to switch over into Catalan. By the turn of the twentieth century, for much of Catalan urban and rural society, Catalanisation was seen increasingly as a value in itself, the only natural vehicle for self-expression, which the Castilian language and Spanish allegedly ‘national institutions’ could only distort or offend.

At the same time, Barcelona, from the mid-nineteenth century onwards, was locked in a demographic race with Madrid for the effective ‘capitality’
or urban leadership of Spanish modernisation. Madrid was fed as much by immigration as Barcelona, but tended to gather from the whole area of the state, while Barcelona tended to receive migrants from relatively nearby regions. As a result of the growing metropolitan rivalry, Barcelona became the effective counter-capital to the official centre of power, a ‘second city’ that seethed with any protest and attracted the discontented of all Spain.

Under the weight of rapid urbanisation, the ‘society of families’ was quickly seen by any attentive outside observer and even more by an immigrant as a closed oligarchy, into which access came only through the regular, traditional channels of linkage. The reliance on kin and, by
extension, ‘mates’ or ‘chums’, produced – as in other parts of Spain – the closed circle of male friends (the colla, in Catalan, like the cuadrilla in Castilian). Colles would meet with other like-minded groups to chat, the Spanish free discussion group or tertulia, often called in Northern Spain a peña. But, in the new, urbanising Catalan society, the Catalan penya was not the equivalent of the Spanish peña = tertulia, plus some formal associative rules. Catalan civil society, thus, was a formal network of associations, backed up by an informal network of family and friendship ties. Both kinds of bonding – as a simultaneous interaction – gave Catalonia its characteristic tightness.

But this distinctive associative flair of Catalan civil society was to face a key problem: instability. A long-term political tradition of private dealings without much institutional life beyond the municipal level has its cost, especially in the lack of perspective, as well as a certain trend towards solipsism. The result is a society that dreams of accords without conflict, but is in fact a very driven social context, based on cut-throat competition and a positive joy in revenge, if not in actual vendetta. All of this is what might be termed Catalan hypocrisy, that is, all those social traits that are virtually invisible to those that live them, but stand out, glaring to the outsider.

The confusion between economic strength and political power

Catalan society, between the late eighteenth (especially after the 1760s) and the early nineteenth centuries was a ‘first comer’ (in the terminology of Walt Whitman Rostow, 1916-2003) to the so-called Industrial Revolution (to use the standard image established by Arnold Toynbee ‘the elder’, 1852-1883). This meant a process of substitution of imports of relatively finished products to using imported raw materials – above all cheap cotton – and working it in Catalonia. Technological adaptation lagged a bit, but not exaggeratedly so: by the 1830s, the switch to steam power was underway, despite labour opposition.
Industrial development coincided with the liberal revolution in Spain, that is the process of legislating for capitalist production, at the expense of the Church and ecclesiastical property. The combination of urban protest and rural civil war basically established the pattern that would dominate Catalan politics for the next century, until the 1930s. Would Catalonia – and especially its capital, Barcelona – be the focus of a new-style, democratic or even post-democratic and socialist revolution? Or would it define its historic nature, whatever that might be in the light of accumulated political rhetoric, in a transformed Spain, based on some kind of representative government?

The ideological, political impact of Romantic ideas gave voice to intellectuals, such as the novelist and liberal historian Balaguer, the federal ideologue (also author of historical studies) Pi Margall (1824-1901), or more conservative publicists (also responsible for historical pieces) like Juan/Joan Mañé Flaquer (1823-1901) or Bofarull. Internally, Catalan-speaking areas, both Catalonia and Valencia to the South, were the scene of semi-permanent civil war during much of the nineteenth century, between Carlists, neo-absolutists and religious fundamentalists (if such a term may be applied to Catholicism), who controlled the mountainous highlands, and the liberal and/or democratic left, who held the cities and the towns. This running violence meant that the left (including the extremists) and the moderate right, despite their mutual dislike, were united against the far right. Therefore, whatever their deeper feelings or motives, all the authors – like those cited above – who gave ideological and historiographic content rather than poetic voice to the Renaixença, the Catalan Renaissance or Rebirth, were forced to accept the liberal program in one way or another, or else they would find themselves defending the muntanya, its rural past and its hopeless future economy, against the winning pressure of urban progress and industrialisation. At the same time, a backward-looking topos was quite tolerable in poetry – indeed it defined much of the movement to recover Provençal motifs in the Jocs Florals (or Tournaments of Flowers, in which contestants disputed each other in verse), ‘recovered’ from medieval reminiscence and held annually in Barcelona after 1859 – but such a blatant recovery of the lost past had no place in what purported to be fact (or at least historical fiction). Writers
such as Balaguer, Pi, Mañé or Bofarull, all attempted, each in his own way, as historians or social theoreticians, to present a modern basis for Catalonia out of its historical experience, as the means for a reorganisation of Spain in terms of the alleged plurality and representativity of medieval Catalan-Aragonese institutions, and based on the simultaneous submission of the Crown of Castile to the royal will, and the Castilian tendency towards imposing its traditions on its neighbours, the crownlands of Aragon, Navarre, and Portugal, leading to their outright annexation.³¹

Following the lead of Scott, both novelist and historian, the arguments of the Romantic Catalan historians naturally looked back to the great conflicts of a century or more before, and reread them in nineteenth-century terms. The Catalan authors who rode the wave of Romanticism – French-borne, even if it could carry German or British ideas – tended, quite naturally, to draw on the literature of historical and/or legal debate, but with either concessions to the new vocabulary of popular sovereignty, or even its enthusiastic embrace. Still writing in Castilian rather than Catalan, Romantic historians rejected the grafting of unitary liberalism on the military tradition of a centralising dynasty. In doing so, in different ways, they recovered the vast repertoire of arguments that dated back to the ‘revolt of the Catalans’ in 1640 and its successive pamphlet wars, and even to earlier literature, now being made available in print, that went back to the thirteenth century. Thus, to begin with, a coherent justification could be made for a long-term historical continuity: a thousand years of ‘Catalan-ness’, especially if one reads words such as natio and/or nació with a modern, nineteenth-century spin. Then came the idea that medieval representation was, especially in Catalonia and Aragon, as valid an antecedent of modern parliamentarianism as the English Magna Carta (1215) was alleged to be: there was, therefore, a ‘Catalan Whig interpretation of history’, of which more later.

Finally, historically justified identity and the strength of a ‘liberty-loving citizenry’ in Catalonia could be understood as a superior basis for a new kind of liberal constitution, which would go back to the ‘natural circumstance’ of Hispanic diversity, still clearly visible, even to foreigners, in the early fifteenth century, before the marriage of Ferdinand of Aragon and Isabella of Castile in 1469. The chance occurrences of the inheritance
of the Catholic Kings (no male heir to both Castile and Aragon, no issue from Ferdinand’s second marriage to Germana (or Germaine) of Foix, the madness of the Castilian heiress Juana, and the death of her Habsburg husband Philip the Fair), made Juana and Philip’s eldest son, Charles of Ghent, born in 1500, the ultimate inheritor to all lands once under control of the Spanish Trastámara dynasties and to the Habsburg territories from Austria and Burgundy. This unforeseeable result distorted the ‘natural’ development of territories and representation by creating a single dynastic Power, which, beyond the temporary access to the German imperial crown, understood itself to be a state and even a nation. This is the heart of Spanish historiography, as opposed to Catalan: ‘Spain’ is imagined as fused after 1512, and thereafter expanded to the Americas, with the conquest of Mexico by Hernán Cortés, in 1519-1521, and later acquisitions. This was the narrative that to all extents and purposes was established by the Jesuit Juan de Mariana (1526-1624), a leading intellectual cleric. Mariana’s *Historia general de España*, published for the first time in Castilian in 1601 (it first appeared in Latin) and completed in 1609, ends its corpus most prudently with the Catholic Kings, Ferdinand and Isabella. The work became the normative text in Spanish on Spanish history until the mid-nineteenth century, republished in many re-editions, in which authors of note or scribblers would attempt, with varying success, to bring it up to date.32

Lacking in perspective due to the war against Napoleonic invasion as well as to their historical sources, the liberals of 1812 had accordingly mistaken a dynastic entity for the People, and accepted a single Spain when even the Crown had been of *Las Españas*, the many and variegated ‘Spains’. It is true that the struggle against the French ‘intruders’ and the establishment of a Bonapartist Monarchy, led to a great deal of evocation of the failed struggle in 1520-1522 of the *Comuneros*, the representatives of the Castilian comunidades, who protested and revolted against Charles of Habsburg as a foreign king, a spendthrift who wasted taxes raised in Castile elsewhere. This historical theme of defeated heroes against absolutism became a central motif of liberal and later democratic protest against the Monarchy throughout the nineteenth century.33
The fact was that Liberalism had been grafted on to the dynastic Bourbon state, in the name of ‘The Desired One’, the king Ferdinand VII deposed and in Napoleon’s safekeeping in a French château. Upon his Restoration in 1814, Ferdinand tried to take advantage of the changes wrought, without the inconvenience of constitutionalism, which led to liberal revolts, a *Liberal Triennium* (1820-1823) that attempted power-sharing with Ferdinand, followed by a new French invasion and occupation, now sanctioned by the European Powers. The tricky Bourbon – now *el rey felón*, ‘the treacherous king’ – was reestablished but left without much support, beyond the oppressive capacity of the dynastic state he touted.

The entire dynamic of the so-called Spanish Revolution begun in 1808 was somewhat different in a Barcelona perspective. Although Catalan liberals of course had read Mariana, they had an entire separate historical tradition to rely on. The most outstanding works in written in Medieval Catalan were works of history, known as the Four Great Chronicles.\(^{34}\) In addition, roughly contemporaneous to Mariana, a quite different history was prepared by one of Philip II’s secretaries, Jerónimo Zurita (1512-1580), an Aragonese born in Saragossa, who spent thirty years of his life researching and writing the *Anales de la Corona de Aragón* (published in three volumes between 1562 and 1580). These Annals traced the history of the Iberian Peninsula from an Aragonese-centered perspective from the Moslem invasion to the reign of Ferdinand the Catholic. There was, accordingly, an alternate reading to the Castilian vision of Mariana of what Spain could be held to be, both historically, retrospectively, and in a political future.\(^{35}\) Were that not enough, Philip II had occupied Aragon with troops in 1590-1593, and decapitated the Chief Justice of Aragon, when challenged on his right to pursue a criminal (his treacherous ex-secretary Antonio Pérez) across the Castilian-Aragonese border. This episode also served nineteenth-century myth-making as a failed struggle against absolutism in the name of local constitutional law, and was an equivalent to the figures for the martyred *comunero* leaders.\(^{36}\)
Thus, seen from the perspective of many Catalan liberals of varied ideological stripes, in interaction both favourably and unfavourably with what was being put forth in Aragon and the Basque North, the ongoing Spanish 'liberal revolution' begun on the death of Ferdinand VII in 1833 had continued down this erroneous path, insisting on splicing the tree of liberty onto the sick trunk of dynastic despotism. But other roads were still open, pointing towards federation or confederacy, as might have happened if any variety of counterfactual developments had taken place, to take ‘the Spains’ down a Catalan path, rather than a Castilian one. If a new Spain were to arise, suddenly capable of recognising what was truly important in the past and therefore able to accept the variety of Spanish territories, then it might even be possible to lure Portugal to join in some kind of Iberian Zollverein, as the first step towards a lasting confederate and/or federal union of the whole Peninsula.
Behind such speculations, however, the idea was basically a bluff: Catalonia, it was asserted, had an identity so strong, and above all, so self-conscious, that it could, by its own collective will and backed by its economic strength, make over the face of Spain. Industrial Catalonia, ‘the factory of Spain’, was said to have evolved bourgeois habits, a strong work ethic, and a unique civil society that disdained the aristocratic pretensions of agrarian Spain, where entrepreneurial talent was lacking. Accordingly, whether conservative or revolutionary in outlook, nineteenth- and twentieth-century Catalans tended to stress their libertarian character, and outsiders emphasised how effectively they combined individualism with practical know-how and patterns of group association not found with the same depth and meaning in the rest of Spain. This vision of the Catalan virtues of modernity in the face of Spanish backwardness merged easily with the argument that Catalan civil society, using better business practice, could remake Spain more effectively than the state and its recourse to coercion. But the central difficulty with such an idealisation of private means and particularism against public force and statism was based on delusion: simply put, Catalan ‘working-class’ organisations were not readily admitted to the interaction of civil society, in all the senses of this expression. Both bourgeois and worker in Catalonia shared a common habit of individualism within networks, of libertarian values that paradoxically always could be shoved down the throat of whomsoever disagreed with them. The common background values, however, never permitted a functional social unity. This was the decisive weakness of Catalan politics, especially vis-à-vis ‘Madrid’, since the state, however liberal it might be (and that includes the Second Republic of 1931-1939) maintained a militarised conception of public order, which was ready to call out troops if the police proved insufficient to quiet any given situation.

But, despite the current insistence – especially in Europe – on the alleged verity of political scientist Joseph S. Nye’s formula of the greater strength of ‘soft power’ (the influence of ideas and money) as opposed to ‘hard power’ (gunboats and troops), the truth was that economic networks (especially with family-owned firms) were not as convincing as bayonets, so that Catalan assertion of the superiority of civil society and its ‘personal
sovereignty’ in the face of the state and its forces never could withstand any real test whenever faced with a challenge.\textsuperscript{42} Nor could cultural affirmation complete the job. Well into the nineteenth century, high culture remained almost exclusively written in Spanish, but poetry, with its strong emotional component, could be voiced in ‘the language of the land’, and indeed often was used to express feelings of belonging.\textsuperscript{43} Romanticism, as it entered Spanish consciousness and letters through Barcelona, made the city’s publishers a major production centre for translations and imitation of imported European discourses. Like so many other parts of Spain at that time, Catalonia was clearly a bilingual territory: Spanish for official business and the realm of ideas, and the local Catalan for most social contact (except at the highest level, which usually meant with outsiders), for intimacy, privacy, and for self-expression in terms of inward emotions.

As revolution progressed after the death of Ferdinand VII in 1833, ‘exalted’ or ‘progressive’ liberalism, with its high-flown universalist sentiment, was often in Spanish, as was the opposing ‘neo-absolutist’ theorising of the Carlists who opposed them, while popular ballads and rhyming illustrated sheets, much like comics a century later, mixed Catalan and Castilian, or evoked earthy feelings (with a special fascination for anal lore) and love stories in Catalan.\textsuperscript{44} By the mid-nineteenth century, the pressure for a literary voice in the Catalan language took on sufficient force to create a market, and, by the late 1880s, became an explicitly political demand for institutionalised recognition of its use in public activities and not merely as some private means of communication.\textsuperscript{45}

But, on balance, the result, until some point between the 1880s and the turn of the twentieth century, largely remained what has been called a dual society, split between its Catalan-ness and its Spanish-ness, with these identities still understood as complementary.\textsuperscript{46} The idea of such sentiments as clearly rival, even explicitly opposed, took some time to develop socially, and has never quite achieved dominance, even up to the seeming confrontation of 2012-2013.
Catalan axioms or prejudices: discursive reiteration and what it can hide

It is usual to insist upon the tenacity of Catalans as regards their identity and their ‘differential fact’ as opposed to Castilian Spain, as well as their stubborn attachment to their language. As already noted, such a considered observer of the Catalan *longue durée* as the French historian Vilar wished to stress this point in his great work on *La Catalogne dans la Espagne moderne* (1962). It is undoubtable that there is a clear connection between cultivated discourse and political polemics from the seventeenth century and the formulation of nationalist positions in the second half of the nineteenth. Without giving more importance to the fact what seems consistent in Catalan political and historiographic discourse from the time of the Habsburgs up to the present is the repetition of certain basic arguments.

The fundamental premise is that the ideal object of all research by Catalans is Catalan society itself and its history, as a reply to specific insults and injuries from Castilian and even French sources. More simply, such repetition answers a tendency towards openly ignoring Catalonia as a field of study, or even expressing clearly derogatory sentiments towards any attempt to take Catalan matters seriously. In particular, this marks a clear caesura between the attitudes of Spanish (Castilian) political and cultural hegemony, and the Catalan desire – not always restricted exclusively to militant nationalists – to effect a similar hegemony, with a similar disdain, for any Castilian presence in a Catalan domain. In other words, the fundamental purpose of Catalan studies on sociopolitical subjects is not to deal with ‘the Other’ in his or her own terrain but rather to reply to any pretensions or slurs with appropriate Catalan testimonials.

Catalanist self-justification consists of some central themes. Pride of place goes to the insistence that Catalonia is neither Castile nor an extension of France: it is simply Catalonia. It has a different language from Castilian Spanish, it has its own literature, and it is as good as any other language, concretely as good as Castilian or French. In second place, ‘Spain’ is a
doubtful entity, one that – in Catalan nationalist perspective – has never really existed. Historically and up to the present, it has remained a state, the Spanish state, but never a nation. Looking backwards, Spain, as in the Roman Hispania, can only be understood as Castile and Catalonia together, on an equal footing. But the Castilians usurped the Hispanic ideal, and appropriated it. They monopolised institutions that should have been common, and failed to give just recognition to the Catalans. The Castilians even took over the term ‘Spain’ itself to the point that they imposed the idea that their own Castilian language was ‘Spanish’, when the Catalan language, strictly speaking, had as much right to such a name.

In third place, France has been a permanent threat. This is an idea that was in general terms valid as long as religion was the principal support for political identification, that is to say, until the first decades of the nineteenth century.50 There was long-standing sentiment against the gratuitous insults, the sexual and moral corruption, and the obstinate military pressure of the gavatxos (a derogatory term equivalent to ‘frogs’), always ready to invade, to steal ‘French Catalonia’ in the mid-seventeenth century (where Castilian was fast imposing itself until French annexation), and then to pour over the mountains with the intent to invade, rape, and plunder.51 Until Napoleon was defeated, and with antecedents going back to before the sixteenth century, Catalans had fought the French together with the Castilians, acting jointly as ‘Spaniards’, despite the lack of recognition and of equality that they might have felt they had to suffer.52

Nevertheless, in fourth place, there is a sullen recognition of French continental predominance, especially in questions of high culture, and an awareness of the relevance of Paris as a major world city that was easily accessed. Such recognition pointed immediately to the consideration that Catalonia in many ways was more similar to France than to Castile, an idea introduced with the pacification of the Franco-Spanish border after the last French occupation in 1823-1827, and French intervention in the Civil War of 1832-1839/40. With the takeoff of Catalan industrialisation, migratory patterns changed and paradoxically more Catalans emigrated to France than Frenchmen – or Occitanians, a term first used, and with regard to language, not people, in 1804 – came to Spain through Catalonia.53 Such a similarity implied the fact that Catalonia was ‘more European’ in its
habits than the rest of the Iberian Peninsula, as it was characterised by an articulated and articulate civil society and internalised customs (such as a comparatively marked punctuality and less unusual mealtimes). Insofar as such 'Europeanness' marked Catalonia, the logical conclusion was that the Catalans should assume the task of modernising Spain.

But, in fifth place, emotions are often paradoxical: the (usually unconscious) measure of Catalan nationalist seriousness has been and remains the Spanish state. The patterns for organising institutions may claim to be derived from entrepreneurship and anchored in the wisdom of civil society, but the Catalan window on power looks onto what is most fervently denied, which is Spanish statehood and its vagaries. A century of Catalan sneers regarding the lazy functionaries of Madrid versus the hardworking businesspeople of Barcelona, but the foremost expression of political autonomy, with the capacity to develop administration without outside control led to rapid social changes among youth as of 1980. The first nationalist cabinet of the restored Generalitat, or Catalan autonomous government, encouraged the rampant growth of bureaucracy, and the corresponding decline of interest in the start-up of small businesses, until then the standard means towards an established life career.

Finally, the sum of all these arguments starting with the self-interest of the exclusivists, so militant as to risk circular solipsism, went down the list of all the affirmative points that stressed Catalonia's unrecognised superiority, so that it added up to a definitive proof: by Catalanist opinion, they made the national consistency of Catalonia completely evident. Together, all these ideas, viewpoints and prejudices together formed an ideological system that was and remains visibly closed upon itself but which, at the same time, has shown itself to be in practice surprisingly flexible within its narrow limits.

The structural ambiguities of Catalanist historiography

The core difficulty or challenge that has faced Catalan historiography since its inception in the mid-nineteenth century is quickly explained, but hard
to overcome: how to go beyond Romanticism? And, in consequence, how to achieve the interpretative distance of positivism or post-positivist historical analysis? For a time, in the mid-twentieth century, many thought they could find the answer by means of some kind of locally adapted Marxism.

The ambiguities are multiple and politically derived, beginning with the core concept of Catalanism itself, which overrides the distinction between nationalism (in the strict independentist sense) and regionalism, within some ideal kind of confederal or even federal rearrangement of Spain. Therefore, Catalonia, understood as a nation without a state, is marked at the same time by two rival desires: a nationalism within a state and a nationalism against the state. By extension, the distinction between what might be Catalan and what is more limitedly Catalanist is quickly and easily lost. This simultaneity of potential interpretations, even potentially contradictory interpretations, is a permanent tactical advantage: any Catalanist sector can, at any given time or in any given situation, play the most convenient role. But this multilateral or proteic nature carries a high strategic cost, which can be observed in the corresponding lack of depth that marks so much of Catalan political theory and published political thought, trapped in a fixed succession of alternatives, and tiresomely reiterative. Accordingly, there is also a trend towards blurring the lines between historiography and literature, insofar as Catalan history becomes understood as only that which is dedicated to the study of Catalonia in the Catalan language. In historical studies, as in so many other aspects, ‘the medium becomes the message’, to use Marshall MacLuhan’s famous and now trite dictum.

Since Catalan historiography is defined by its social demand, which is highly politicised and scantly market-related (there are few readers for hyper-detailed research, and, for the rest, ‘everybody knows’ the basics), it remains very consistent with itself, to the point of deadening repetition. As a discipline, it favours a kind of intimacy with an insinuation of the collective past as being nostrat, untranslatable in English, but meaning ‘ours-ish’. The affectation of inwardness has an important and unhappy collateral effect, whereby historiographic value is judged not by criticism, but rather is esteemed to be a reaffirmation of the background consensus.
through new empirical research. Facts, accordingly, do not alter interpretation, but only can serve to reinforce an explanation already familiar: at heart, the answer is the same to all imaginable questions.

Outsiders however can abound, as long as they adhere to the unwritten rules of the consensus, and do not ask embarrassing questions, in which case they are simply and systematically boycotted. This response is easy to sustain as basically only Catalans are interested in the details of Catalan nationalism, and foreign experts in nationalism are expected to be hostile, given the dominant prejudice in the social sciences regarding nationalism as a ‘bad’ ideology. Since the outsiders do not catch all the details, and their contribution to interpretation is not of interest, the result is a two-track market, based on internal empiricism and external speculation, which remain parallel, unconnected.

Furthermore, and perhaps more important, ‘Hispanists’ in general, including as ‘foreign’ all Spanish historians, are explicitly understood to be hostile to a catalano-centric viewpoint which is accepted axiomatically as inherently correct. Even today, leading Catalan historians who understand themselves as ‘nationalist’ consider explicitly that there are only two possible viewpoints: a Catalan national approach and its opposing Spanish national perspective. Whoever claims to study the field and does not have a Catalan national attitude is a ‘cosmopolitan’, that is, a secret pro-Spaniard. On the other hand, Spanish historians are increasingly ostentatious in their affirmation of a desacomplesjado (‘uninhibited’ in Castilian) Spanish perspective, which claims to be ‘constitutionalist’, and above any demeaning ‘nationalist’ prejudices.

How have Catalan historians dealt with these facets of the same problem over the last two hundred years? By both textual criticism of Medieval sources (which meant idealising the glories of the ‘Catalan-Aragonese crown’) and by Romantic mythologising, at the same time but also with deep disagreements as to the best way to reconstruct a past that could be both politically sensitive and scientifically accurate. The background idea that won out, by the end of the nineteenth century, was a Catalanist version of the English ‘Whig interpretation of history’ (as analysed by Sir Herbert Butterfield, 1900-1979), a mixture of both austracista and
nineteenth-century Carlist ‘lost cause’ reinventions, adapted by Enric Prat de la Riba (1870-1917), the founder of modern nationalist politics, to the exigencies of inventing a modern electoral party. With the twentieth century, the Whig interpretation was subtly re-elaborated by adaptation to modern nationalist historiography, by such historians as Antoni Rovira Virgili (1882-1949) and Ferran Soldevila (1894-1971), who combined justificatory research with a solid background politicisation (based on the idea of national territory as equal to national population, through history, such an equation being a ‘nation’).

The confusion between politics and ideology in Catalan discourse – especially in the journalistic sphere, but including academic production – was thus absolute. The answer had to come from a form of academic discipline that would simultaneously work at an academic level and be easily understood in political terms, without confronting either revolutionary control in Catalonia during 1936-1939, nor the harsh anti-Catalanist repression of the Franco regime after 1939. The solution was simple, and very much appropriate to the 1930s: apply geopolitics, which made all the ambiguities coherent, while placing any historical discussion on a solid social base, which could differentiate between the fifteenth and the twentieth centuries, a distinction that someone like Prat de la Riba was incapable of doing, and which was too complex for scholars like Rovira Virgili. This was an extremely clever method by which to unravel the Romantic knot into which Catalanist historiography had tied itself by the evolution of politics. This geopolitical approach was the hallmark of a young and very hardworking historian, Jaume Vicens Vives (1910-1960).

Vicens took la terra (a nationalist term with centuries-old resonance, literally meaning the Catalan earth, but perhaps better understood as its dynamic space) as a determining point from which to analyse the Catalan past, present, and even its possible future. With a very sharp mind, Vicens could shift his style to prevailing winds, give the German angle a clear, shiny French veneer thought after the school of Paul Vidal de la Blache
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(1845-1918). At the same time, Vicens also could introduce demographics through such sources – already in use in Catalonia among statisticians – as showed by the outstanding Italian statistical sociologist Corrado Gini (1884-1965), who while a leading scientific light was also an ardent follower of Benito Mussolini, willing to write in print about the scientific basis of fascism. As a young scholar before the Civil War, Vicens did not flinch at challenging the standard nationalist discourse, by taking on Rovira Virgili, a then unheard-of audacity in Catalan cultural circles.61

With a geographically focused use of geopolitics, which de-emphasised political territories and preferred demography as a solid backup, Vicens was acutely aware of the sociological and economic tools being brought into historiographical writing at this time (for example the French social historian Ernest Labrousse, the director of Vilar’s dissertation for the doctorat ès lettres, the highest degree in the old French system).62 Using such materials as his inspiration, Vicens could be ‘materialist’, without recourse to Marxism, but use Marxist insights if he liked. He was the perfect chameleon, but with an aim, a sense of purpose. But, although ‘exiled’ to another university outside Catalonia after the Civil War in punishment for having remained in the ‘Red Zone’, Vicens also was willing to appear as very close to discourse agreeable to the franquista or even falangista (the Spanish ‘fascist’ party under Franco).63 But he could also say very different things in contexts not subject to Franco regime censorship.64 Vicens offered a foundation, but open to the need for ambiguity in more than one way. This is where Marxism or neo-Marxism came in, through his disciples, and after his early death, around the emblematic year of 1968.

The negation of Spain and the problem of a French alternative

Many of the basic, unwritten reflexes of a Catalan nationalist stance have been translated into narrative coherency through historical writing, from the end of the nineteenth century onwards. Any questioning of the basic
catalanisme was automatically understood to be espanyolisme, ‘Spanishism’, the historiographic expression of Spanish nationalism. In fact, españolismo (in Castilian) is an extremely harsh facet of Spanish nationalism – a sentiment fully as complex as Catalanism – which first appeared in the only ‘separatist’ locale to successfully confront and defeat Spanish ‘unionism’: nineteenth-century Cuba, which then served as an inspiration to all nationalisms in Spain, both centripetal and centrifugal.65 As opposed to historiographic clarity, in Catalanian political practice the choice between ‘Catalan-ness’ and ‘Spanish-ness’ has been and remains remarkably vague. In history, as a temporal refuge where past and future can meet without contradiction, Catalan nationalists have found the purity of strategic perspective, forever lost in day-to-day political negotiation, in which tactics consume all energies.

As can expected, the Spanish perspective is different, if not quite the reverse. From a Spanish viewpoint Catalans are endlessly whining about nothing, since they have a key role in the economy and virtually (it is alleged, with considerable exaggeration) ‘own’ much of the whole country anyway.66 Catalans are catalano-centric or barcelono-centric, ignoring the variety of a Spain that is much more than a mere Catalan-Castilian confrontation, with a few Basques on the side. That said, Spanish nationalist historical writing, liberal or conservative, left-wing or right-wing, with scant difference, has perceived Catalan historiography as a threat. This, however, is to the limited extent that Spanish history writing – outside of economic historiography and subjects privileged by ideological sympathies and Romantic fantasy, like the anarcho-syndicalist labour movement – has shown interest in Catalan affairs. Fear of (especially Catalan) separatism has been part of a broader discourse of threats to national unity and collective survival, rather than a source of massive written production. By habit, Spanish nationalism has insisted more on external threats or fears of ‘mutilation’ (the British presence in Gibraltar or the Moroccan threat of annexation to the small cities of Ceuta and Melilla on the North African shore), than on internal enemies capable of producing a dismemberment from the inside out. In sum, beyond the pages of the more scandalous press, particularly visceral in recent times, there is little serious attention paid – in academic article or in book form –
to the danger in Spain from what is sometimes purported to be akin to ‘cancerous tumoration’.\textsuperscript{67} In other words, seen from Madrid, Catalan nationalism and Catalanist historiography represent a part that confuses itself with the whole. Its complaints, accordingly, never rate the attention that the Catalans think they deserve.\textsuperscript{68}

‘What about the other regions?’ is often the more sensitive reply from the centre. ‘This is nothing more than a diversionary attack’, they reply from the ramparts of Catalan nationalism, a trick as to better lessen the inherent variety of ‘Hispania’, a ‘nation of nations’, alternative to the centralised Spain. Instead of the imposed and enforced unity of Spain, it is argued, Barcelona and Catalonia could have invented another more flexible Iberian reality, and, given the chance, perhaps still could (the current ‘autonomic state’ was a mechanism in 1977 to lessen the outstanding nature of Catalan claims and the pretensions of the Basque nationalist terrorism of ETA). This view of a different, more plural Spain is one of the major strategic options that lie hidden in Catalanist historiography, from Balaguer onwards. The second option is the opposite extreme: if the Catalans cannot reinvent Spain as it should have been, then perhaps they could go it alone, in the Irish mould, be \textit{Nosaltres sols}, ‘ourselves alone’, the literal translation of the Hibernian \textit{Sinn Féin}, which served as the name of a radical nationalist grouping, of the 1930s, vaguely leaning towards armed struggle.\textsuperscript{69} These two extremes represent the recognised duality in Catalan political thinking and, more implicitly, in Catalan historiography, termed, in local code, \textit{Catalunya enfora} and \textit{Catalunya endins}, respectively ‘Catalonia looking outwards’ (towards rethinking a new Spain), and ‘inwards’ (towards full self-affirmation, turning the Sapir-Whorf sociolinguistic theory of ‘living in a language’ into a literal, functional reality, imposed through independent statehood).\textsuperscript{70}

Beyond the persistent contradiction between strategic dreams and practical tactics, the evident difficulty with much of these outward and inward projections is that there is an immediate fallback choice, somewhat worn by the twenty-first century, but still influential: as a Pyrenean entity, Catalonia faces Spain, but is backed up to France; or, more precisely, to French Catalonia, the \textit{Département des Pyrénées-Orientales}. During the last decades Catalan nationalists have preferred calling it \textit{Catalunya nord}, as
part of the *Països Catalans* – literally the ‘Catalan Countries’, but best understood as the totality of all the Catalan-speaking territories, in Spain, France and Italy (in theory, one town in northern Sardinia still speaks Catalan).71

In the first four decades of the twentieth century, up to the Civil War of 1936-1939, Catalans, avid to see what ‘Madrid’ could not perceive, explored the contemporary world and its varied experiments in translation, through French eyes, through the French press and rich French political commentary in books and reviews. The then special industrial climate of Barcelona, its nature as a unique Mediterranean metropolis, its deep diversity from the rest of Spain were well known, recognised both inside and outside Spanish borders. So is the longevity of anarcho-syndicalism, which flourished in Catalonia (and elsewhere in Spain) when it had become a mere testimonial current elsewhere, including France.72 Catalan political habits were notoriously more ‘French’ than Spanish. Catalan intellectual life was in practice an intensely Frenchified culture within Spain, Francophile but not francophone, which proudly expressed itself in the local language, to the never-ending surprise of Parisian intellectuals.73 But such relative dependency never became merely a *comprador* import culture, as Catalans of all stripes were consistent in their creativity, even eccentricity. Nationalists could even dream of a Greater Catalonia, which not only incorporated the Catalan-speaking areas of Spain, such as Valencia or the Balearic Islands, but encompass all Occitania, as far north as the Auvergne, in a vast ‘Pan-Catalanist’ union, in which a revived cultural presence centred on Barcelona would impose itself on the superficialities of the European state system.74

At the same time, because of the French link and Barcelona’s role as *le petit Paris du sud*, Catalan models usually led Spanish political fashions. Given its peculiar stance, both political and intellectual, Catalonia in the first half of the twentieth century was much more a cultural suburb of France than a peculiar province of Spanish letters and ideology. Catalanism in particular represented the filter through which German and Central European concepts, mostly in French translation, or English and North American notions, by way of Cuba, were imported to Hispanic markets, adjusted
always to the centrality of Paris as a world capital and to corresponding French political and intellectual fashions. Italian intellectual currents were an exciting alternative, however with the concession of dependency towards Paris as a cultural hub that was common to Barcelona; but Milanese innovation was never more than a counterpoint to whatever was coming out of the ville lumière. Madrid was nowhere in this perspective, except as a centre of government.75

By the 1930s, with Italy fully under Mussolini’s fascist rule and Germany submerged in Nazism, Catalan ideological experimentation tested limits far beyond what was unimaginable elsewhere in Europe, in the willingness to mix ideological alternatives of all sorts, leftist and conservative, revolutionary and rightist, anarchist libertarian and étatiste. Due to this eclecticism (and its internal contradictions), Catalan politics could seem a key reply to fascism (hence, for example, British essayist George Orwell’s famed Homage to Catalonia, first published in 1938), but, at the same time, also could remain focused on a nationalist problem, no matter how revolutionary its anarcho-syndicalists or communists.76 At heart, Catalan nationalism had a serious problem with any fascist scheme of its own: it conceived power in terms of civil society rather than the state, and independence as physical guarantee to the full operational freedom of that same civil society.77 For this reason, Catalan separatists – no matter how influenced by Italian examples – could always try to come to some arrangement with the anarcho-syndicalists and vice-versa. Similarly, communism seemed attractive because it talked about ‘class behaviour’, syndicates and factories, understood as physical, even tangible values in civil society, as opposed to the idealisation of the state and its vast power, which was, in Catalan historical experience, Spanish, distant and nasty. In addition, communism was much further away than fascism, while Italy was a known value, the manifest alternative, across a short stretch of sea, to France. In Catalan separatism, the familiar forms of Western European politics combined with the unusual circumstances of Spanish politics to produce an illuminating exception to the usual patterns of ideological polarisation.
The survival of Catalan populism

The Civil War and the triumph of militant ‘Spanish-ism’ in the Franco régime, a personal dictatorship which had little to hold it together beyond Spanish nationalism (its official title was the Estado Español, the Spanish state, thus avoiding the choice between Monarchy and Republic), permitted the seemingly characteristic tendency of Catalan political and intellectual culture towards the mixing and synthesis of ideological discourses to increase wildly. Everything was clandestine, and there was no link to the ‘reality’ of franquista administrative life, hence the imagination was free to roam and bring together the most impossible combinations. To cite a clear example: all the ‘new left’ of the 1960s came to neo-Marxism through the Catholic aggiornamento, a Roman Church become ‘up-to-date’, inspired by Vatican Council II (1962-1965). So new historical ‘stories’ could be merged.\(^\text{78}\)

Accordingly, up to the 1950s, Catalan politics continued to represent a special circumstance in European political development. Unlike strictly Spanish politics, Catalan nationalist politics ran on a European rhythm, with the same sort of ideological fascinations common to Western Europe, but with a strongly distorting perception, given the centrifugal, anti-centralist, even anti-statist trends. While Catalan radical nationalists were not a significantly intellectual presence (rather, the more conservative Catalanists and the moderate nationalists had an effective monopoly there), the ongoing experience of separatist militancy, and the possible models that ultra-Catalanists or extremists would interpret in their own way, serves with hindsight to correct some of the more gratuitous generalisations that abound concerning the relation between fascism and die-hard nationalism in twentieth-century European politics. The anomalous nature of Catalan radical nationalism, its exceptional preference for communism – especially Stalinism – instead of fascism, warns against the simplifications of interpretative theory.\(^\text{79}\)

Anarcho-syndicalism failed and proved impossible to revive after the Franco regime petered out in the late 1970s.\(^\text{80}\) Catalan communism, with its frontpopulista or ‘popular front’ component, seemed, at the time of the
The persistent memory of the Esquerra populism of the 1930s permitted the recovery of autonomy, under Josep Tarradellas (1899-1988), the
president-in-exile of the Republican Generalitat of Catalonia. In late 1977, he negotiated his return with full recognition of his institutional role. The Spanish side, somewhat perversely and against Tarradellas’s intentions, invented a regional solution for everybody, creating the constitutional basis for the Estado de las autonomías, a generalised autonomic system, neither exactly federal nor composed of subordinate local entities, but rather ambiguous, sui generis, which allowed the recognition of other nationalist areas (the Basque Country, Galicia, even Andalusia or the Canary Islands) together with a regionalised and subdivided Castile, within some kind of whole. This would be the only formal and explicit carry-over of Republican institutions from the 1930s integrated into the new Constitutional set-up of 1978. In Catalonia, somewhat paradoxically, in the end it was not the left, with its claims to incarnate the 1930s experience, but rather a revised and quite eclectic version of populism, sanitised and made moderate in its implications with an important Catholic (or Christian Democrat) admixture, while retaining all the vigour of leftist discourse, which dominated Catalan politics under the long-term leadership of Jordi Pujol (°1930), who managed to govern uninterruptedly from 1980 to 2003, when he retired from politics (and his coalition thereupon lost the elections in that year).

To the mythology of the ‘once and future’ revolutionary experience of the left, Pujolism (as it came to be known) added an intense confusion between conservationism, understood as the preservation of the external signs of the past (including a lost landscape and the accompanying natural ecology), and conservatism, that is the extension of the ideal of preservation to a social context, understood as a community, situated both in historical time and outside its deleterious effects. More clumsily, there was also a nationalist attempt to coopt the autonomous regions of Valencia and the Balearics into some sort of project for a unity of Catalan-speaking lands, which met with fierce resistance, especially from the Valencian right. The heady mix of Pujolism proved basically incomprehensible beyond the borders of Catalonia. Nevertheless, Pujolism showed itself quite capable of survival, both as historiography and as extended ideology, although the loss of patronage left a considerable intellectual confusion after its abrupt and unexpected departure from power. The coalition of
socialists, communists and nationalists that replaced Pujol had no clear ideological alternative, and a considerable upsurge of independentist sentiment, loud but insubstantial in practical terms, has proved to be the result. The main point is that such independentism never before had achieved such visibility, a phenomenon attributed by most cool-headed observers to the frustration of economic 'recession'.

To sum up the situation, the 1930s were idealised as a coherent nationalist-revolutionary experience with a defined historiographic viewpoint, all a considerable exaggeration, to put it mildly. While politics and historiography should correctly be seen as separate strands, in practice, the link has been very close, for a simple reason. The field of historia contemporánea/història contemporània in both Spain and Catalonia was literally born in the 1960s. From its inception it was marked with a sharp sense of anti-Franco militancy, as well as with a strong intellectual dependency on neo-Marxism, which supplanted the need to know much about sociology, anthropology or economics. An outstanding figure like Vicens Vives acted as prophet of this perspective. Under Franco, he successfully mixed a certain background Catalanist historiography with German (or French) geopolitics, which opened the door to a materialist interpretation, first utilising ‘economicism’ (and, of course, geography), then moving openly towards neo-Marxism after the 1970s. Although Vicens began as a medievalist, he created contemporary studies (that is, Early Modern history, as it is called in Spanish) in both Spain and Catalonia, virtually out of almost nothing. Furthermore, he also established the groundwork for economic history. Though Vicens, who died in 1960 at the age of fifty after a prodigious amount of work, did not deal with Catalan nationalism as a professional historian, he is in many ways the key figure who has dominated so much of the discussion. Even current historical debate in Catalonia remains largely anchored in the ambiguous terms in which he expressed himself. Catalan historians are still talking worshipfully about Vicens, they are really discussing politics, not ideology, and they are debating even less about history in strict professional or analytic terms.

Franco died on 20 November 1975, and the titular heir, the Bourbon prince Juan Carlos, inherited kingship, and initiated a process
of change (cambio, the Spanish buzzword of the moment) toward
democratic institutions and a more open consumer life-style. This
democratic transition was marked by strong generational shift. Leaving to
one side the complex dynamics of regime change, the net social result was
that those who had waited out the end of the Franco dictatorship,
teenagers or in their early twenties in 1939, were brusquely swept aside
by aggressive thirty-somethings and some forty-year-olds, who had only to
suffer the mildest last era of Franco repression, when urban growth and
economic development rather than scarcity and harsh censorship had
marked the pattern of daily life. This generational shift had a
Corresponding effect on historians, and brought a new generation to the
fore, although they remained quietly under the tutelage of Vicens’s
disciples (Jordi Nadal, Joan Reglà, Josep Fontana, or Emili Giralt were the
most outstanding university professors, together with some of their
younger friends or associates, who had not studied directly with the
master, like Josep Termes or Albert Balcells).

Given the dynamics of the democratic transition of the 1970s and early
1980s, such a synthetic evocation became the official explanation of the
past. In Catalonia, the real consensus underlying the relation between
ideology and historiography was marred by an unresolved tension
between the neo-Marxist thrust and the nationalist emphasis on continuity
(which explained much of the local battles between historians). The neo-
Marxist criticism of bourgeois nationalism was in 1967 launched by the
quite critical study of moderate political nationalist Prat de la Riba, quickly
on his way to undisputed patriotic canonisation, by political scientist Jordi
Solé Tura (1930-2009).88 The nationalist reply was led by Termes (1936-
2011), a former Marxist, who held that Catalan identity was a sustained
characteristic of the popular classes, as opposed to the bourgeois tendency
to run and hide under the skirts of the Spanish state when faced with
working-class revolutionism.89 Other historians, such as Balcells (born
1940), both more empiricist and more productive, attempted unsuccessfully to take leadership in nationalist historiography.90 Despite
this ongoing controversy, the Catalan version of the appropriate
historiographic synthesis was for two decades repeated over and over in
classrooms, the press, radio and television.91 The intense public
admiration accorded to French scholar Vilar, a lifelong extreme Stalinist and a warm admirer of Catalonia and its traditions, was one indication of this tacit ideological-historiographic understanding, as was the outstanding career of Fontana (born 1931), universally considered the leading Catalan historian, founder of at least two university departments of historical studies which have reflected closely his prejudices.92

Precisely because the discourse of collective historiographic modernity was Marxist, the consequence has been generalised conceptual confusion after the collapse of Communism. The rise of Història Contemporània had been marked by an exaggerated overconcentration on politics and political parties, at the expense of other subjects or approaches. Any ‘linguistic turn’ in a postmodern direction is still generally dismissed, as that would mean the end of a teleological axiom behind all interpretations, more or less leftist. In the early 1990s, there was even what was deemed to be a katalanische Historikerstreit, a series of historical confrontations, bitter, certainly unresolved, comparable in some ways to the debate which occupied German historians in 1986-1987, and, by extension, many other historical or media publications in other countries around those same years.93

The loss of credibility of communism as an analytic style should have had evident repercussions: instead, both Spanish and especially Catalan historiography remained happily oblivious to the intellectual changes, right up to the present. Concessions were made to feminism, which was given a narrow and otherwise ignored space as women’s history (pioneered by an Irish immigrant scholar to Catalonia, Mary Nash), but academic circles ostentatiously ignored other postmodern trends, including queer theory or postcolonial studies.94 Such blindness was reaffirmed even as Barcelona became a homosexual tourist haven, with the logical increased attention to local sexual minorities, and the link between nineteenth-century Catalan industrialisation and the development of Cuba’s overheated, sugar-export capitalism became more and more evident to leading (but isolated) investigators, notably Josep Maria Fradera.95 Asking when and how the reifications – ‘nation’, ‘class’, and so forth – took hold, with what sort of exchanges between politics, creative literature and historiography, still remains an interrogation for
the future, seemingly beyond the scope of both the leading promotions of Catalan historians and their younger disciples, not much predisposed to challenging dominant nationalist conventional wisdom.

Catalan historiography and politics since the 1990s

Between 2003 and 2010, under the tripartite coalition of socialists, Esquerra nationalists, and revamped communists, the frontpopulista historiographic discourse, with its characteristic mix of nationalist and revolutionary clichés from the 1930s, retained functional orthodoxy. The current ambient, since the nationalist electoral victory in the Catalan parliamentary elections of November 2010, is one of heightened ‘independentist’ rhetoric, an extensive discourse that has overshadowed older themes, and which requires some greater explanation.

Pujol, after his rise to power in 1980, had expected a nationalist/communist political dyarchy. Much of his early strategy was aimed at weakening the base of strong communist opinion, first by playing the card of a reborn anarcho-syndicalism (which failed), and then by eliminating Tarradellas, who had no specific clientele of his own. Once president, Pujol actually believed that all the Catalonia of the 1930s needed so as to reappear, modernised and sanitised by the growth policies of the Franco regime, was a mere sequence of nationalising steps. The Catalans, after all, were still there. Catalan control of at least part of the media (press, but above all radio and television) and, most important, for nationalists to assume a monopoly of primary and secondary education, as to ‘catalanise’ the children of the Andalusian immigrants, whom he saw as anomic in the Durkheimian sense, and lacking on appropriate Catalan know-how in the fine art of living in a civil society.

Although Pujol considered himself to be (and was openly believed by his followers to be) a serious thinker, he distrusted the brunt of the intelligentsia, except his own followers who were conspicuously outside the universities, and in political science and history, strongly Marxist. Pujol, who most explicitly took Vicens as his guide in matters of
interpretation, preferred the figure of Soldevila as the lead to follow in official, commemorative, historical activities. Lacking pujolista support among historians in the 1980s, the traditional style of Soldevila was a more convenient orientation. Since Pujol was in power for over two decades, he wore down, not his opponents, but rather the opposition: eventually, by the end of the 1980s, younger and more affirmatively nationalist historians began to appear, in tune with the Catalan government’s desires and needs.

Much standardised Catalanist enthusiasm had to be produced to impose a nationalist spin on historical commemorations in the 1990s. Pujolista self-styled ‘talibans’ acted as commissars with an exalted sense of entitlement, while Pujol gave lectures on Vicens and the overall sense of Catalan history. In the writing of history, Catalan nationalist interpretations increasingly challenged the Marxists, who tended to adopt a defensive strategy of insisting almost exclusively on certain subjects surrounding the Civil War of 1936-1939, such as the systematic investigation and active disinterment of leftist victims of right-wing execution squads. These ‘crimes against humanity’ were studied in the name of ‘democratic memory’, especially during the years (1996-2004) in which the Catholic-oriented conservatives under José María Aznar held the central government, in a warm relation with the Catalan nationalists during his first term, and then with much anti-Catalan demagoguery in his second. Needless to say, a new rightist, even ultra-right historiography, often more oriented towards the media and with less emphasis on academic credentials, grew up in answer to the left, actively discussing rightists who were shot or otherwise killed in Republican-held areas. Its tenor, in Spanish, is actively anti-nationalist, conflating Basque terrorism quite unjustly with Catalan circumstance.

Even before its electoral defeat, an aging Pujol lost control of his political coalition. After the voting of November 2003, the unthinkable became possible: the socialists had sufficient post-election strength in the Catalan parliament to ally themselves with the post-communists and the Esquerra, now an independentist party. This modified the disposition of public resources, now going to the left and to the radical nationalists. For the first time, an independentist historiography arose, devoted to tracing its own
past and not to adhering strictly to the well-worn discourse of mainstream nationalism. The upshot has been an ongoing discussion, up to the November 2010 regional elections in which the left-nationalist coalition met defeat: the theme for consensus would be *sobiranisme*, literally meaning ‘sovereignty-ism’ and to be understood as pro-independence or pro-confederacy, depending on ideological taste. Marxism resists its decline, ensconced in some university departments. But ambiguity and politicisation still reign; the latter expressed as the love of *compromís* (‘commitment’ in both the Catholic and communist sense). Distance and cool reflection are not yet locally in demand, as again was shown by the explosion of reckless independentism at all levels in the autumn of 2012, spurred on by a spectacular demonstration on the Catalan nationalist holiday of September 11. In any case, outsiders tend to align themselves to local knowledge.

Nevertheless, the sheer weight of university massification led to a considerable amount of historical investigation, most of it empiricist in focus, with scant interpretative innovation. Such an amount of information made many highly ideological narrations less tenable. As more historical ‘facts’ were challenged by the simple accumulation of new research, the more insistence became paramount on the language itself, rather than on the national past or the importance of Catalanist history.96 Such a reduction of the role of history and historians brought with it a great and uncontrolled power exercised by rival clans of philologists, linguists, and social linguists, politically more reliable as nationalists than were the historians. The different philological clans kept fighting and changing the rules of ‘correct’ speaking and writing. The conviction, which was at the heart of the Pujolian synthesis, that radio and television, combined with education in Catalan, would impose Catalan over Castilian and restore the past, was ultimately unsuccessful. The children of immigrants of the 1960s learned Catalan at school but preferred to continue to speak Spanish unless proficiency in Catalan led to a public service job.

The long Pujol years were marked by a sustained deindustrialisation of Catalonia, answered by the permanent expansion of the public sector, reinforced by the session of administrative functions that the central state devolved onto Catalonia as an autonomous region. Nevertheless, by the
late 1990s, the *langue vécu* on the streets of Barcelona was Castilian, and
the formal *langue du travail* in public service offices was Catalan. This was
a complete reversal of the situation of 1939, in which until the Civil War it
always marked Catalan society as a whole. This confirmed a paradox: the
more ‘anthropologically Spanish’ Catalans became in their habits, the more
the ‘differential fact’ ceased to be a work ethic, a more European idea of
punctuality, and a greater entrepreneurial impulse (accompanied by
disdain for ‘lazy’ functionaries, such as peopled ‘Madrid’). With a
*Generalitat* with thousands of Catalan public servants, with such jobs now
at a premium and no great desire for small business start-ups, the only
‘differential fact’ was *language*. Catalans had become what foreigners had
always taken them to be: Spaniards who were bi-lingual, with another
Hispanic language of their own, and who had a major city that dominated
their ‘local’ society and challenged Madrid (even if after 1970 it had lost
the population race for equality of inhabitants with the state capital). And
here is the paradox: without the comforting awareness of their
anthropological and sociological differential fact, reduced to language as a
frontier, separatist sentiment grew, and many were more willing to
emphasise (at least to a poll taker) their readiness to live in an
independent Catalan state.

As long as Catalans knew they were ‘different’, their attitude leaned
towards a *positive* nationalism, which could exist, co-exist, perhaps even
aspire to take over Spain to modernise it. Faced with a modernised
Spanish society, they increasingly tend towards a *negative* nationalism,
which stresses the ‘injustice’ of their situation, the disproportionate taxes
they allegedly pay, and, above all, the need for a break.

**Conclusion**

Catalanist historiography has all the structural instabilities of a *littérature
de combat*, seemingly forever trapped in its preconceptions and
prejudices.97 If any Catalanist historian abandons the straight and narrow
path, and asks the wrong questions – even if he or she asks almost any
questions outside the ideological scenario approved of or shared by the
diverse sectors of the nationalist movement – it is as if he or she has passed over to the enemy; to explore any of the contradictions within Catalan nationalism between differing currents is to side automatically with one against the other, merely by posing such a line of inquiry. Perforce, such requirement of loyalty and/or bias means that the work is political, not historical. Clearly, the central issue, brutally put, is: how does one seriously study the national life of a nation which has never existed as a nation in any, except the most nationalist understanding of the term? Here, evidently, we encounter the ‘invention of tradition’, but that cannot be considered as a serious answer to the problem of a politicised historiography. But, to be as fair as possible, this same question can be formulated in many ways: for example, one could ask how the sustained politicisation over time of the historical imagination conditioned the indubitable, even stubborn persistence of aspects of Catalan social life. Even the most nationalist Catalan historian could make this query, as could the most anti-nationalist.

That shared reassessment may come sooner rather later, given the degree of extreme change undergone by Catalanian society in the last decade. Mass immigration between 2001 and 2005 (mostly Moroccan and South American, especially from Ecuador) numbered approximately one million plus new inhabitants engrossing Barcelona and other nearby cities, even reaching rural towns (with another million to Madrid as the alternate pole of attraction), until the economic crisis and the effects of unemployment began to drive newcomers home after 2009-2010. The visible collapse of urban small commerce after 2010, the traditional heart of Catalanist sentiment promises to radically alter the pattern of city life in Catalan. Accordingly, old assumptions, well-worn truisms, and the familiar habits of thinking no longer serve any clarifying purpose. Very recently, a strongly nationalist historian, the then head of the think-tank of the CDC, Pujol’s old party, addressed a historical conference, and surprisingly called for a completely new historical approach, with no preconceptions. Only time will tell if this was just a sudden intellectual impulse which took an alleged ‘national transition’ to independence as a given or was a harbinger of major conceptual innovation in historiographic attitudes, a switch
which evidently rides on the expectations of a different, non-traditional yet Catalan future.99

Endnotes

1 An earlier and somewhat different version of this text appeared under the title ‘The historiography of Catalanism. Ambiguities and consistencies in the imaging of Catalan nationalism in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries’, in: Wetenschappelijke tijdingen, 64/special issue (2005) 92-133.


7 A. Jutglar, Pi y Margall y el federalismo español (Madrid, 1976) 2 vol.


11 There is an extensive sociological literature on immigration, none of it satisfying given its extreme ideologisation. See M. Subirats, *Barcelona. De la necessitat a la llibertat* (Barcelona, 2012).


17 Any discussion of Catalan Romantic novels has to immediately confront the problem of whether one is referring to works written in the Catalan language, of which the first is undoubtedly A. de Bofarull, *La Orfaneta de Menargues à
Catalunya agonisant (Madrid - Barcelona, 1862), or novels based on historical themes of the Catalan past, even with something approaching a proto-nationalist sub-text, but written in Castilian. As examples: V. Balaguer, Don Juan de Serrallonga. Novela original (Barcelona, 1858); J. Hernández del Mas, El último suplicio de las libertades catalanas. Segunda parte de Felipe V el Animoso. Novela original (Barcelona, 1858); R. del Castillo, Roger de Flor ó la venganza de catalanes. Novela histórica (Barcelona - Madrid, [1864]).


21 See the introduction in volume 1 of the massive P. Vilar, Catalunya dins l’Espanya moderna. Recerques sobre els fonaments econòmics de les estructures


23 For the vitality of the ‘society of families’ up to the present: P. Cullell & A. Farràs, L’oasi català. Un recorregut per les bones families de Barcelona (Barcelona, 2001); G. Wray McDonogh, Good families of Barcelona. A social history of power in the industrial era (Princeton, 1986).

24 F. Cabana i Vancells, Caixes i bancs de Catalunya (Barcelona, 1996-2000) 4 vol.


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31 A. de Bofarull i Brocà, Hazañas y recuerdos de los catalanes (Barcelona, 1846); V. Balaguer, Bellezas de la historia de Cataluña (Barcelona, 1853) 2 vol.; V. Balaguer, Historia de Cataluña y de la Corona de Aragón, escrita para darla a conocer al pueblo (Barcelona, 1860-1863) 5 vol.; A. de Bofarull y Brocá, Historia crítica (civil y eclesiástica) de Cataluña (Barcelona, 1876-1878) 9 vol.; A. de Bofarull y Brocá, La confederación catalano-aragonesa, realizada en el período más notable del gobierno soberano del Conde de Barcelona, Ramón Berenguer IV: estudio histórico, crítico y documentado/por Antonio de Bofarull y Brocá, premiado por unanimidad en el certamen abierto en 15 de diciembre de 1869 por el Ateneo Catalán (facsimile edition: Valencia, 1997 [Barcelona, 1872]).

32 There are numerous complete versions of Mariana online. For example http://archive.org/details/historiageneral01mari [accessed 15/3/2013].


34 M. de Montoliu, Les quatre grans cròniques (Barcelona, 1959).


36 C. López de Haro, La constitución y libertades de Aragón y el justicia mayor (Madrid, 1926).

38 N. Ferguson (ed.), Historia virtual. ¿Qué hubiera pasado si...? (Madrid, 1998); R. Crowley (ed.), What if? The world’s foremost military historians imagine what might have been (New York, 1999).

39 J.A. Rocamora, El nacionalismo ibérico 1792-1936 (Valladolid, 1994).

40 A. García Balañà, La fabricació de la fàbrica. Treball i política a la Catalunya cotonera, 1784-1884 (Barcelona, 2004).

41 D. López Garrido, La Guardia Civil y los orígenes del Estado centralista (Barcelona, 1982).


45 As is to be expected, the Renaixença has been little explored conceptually but much studied. The classic nationalist evocation as an awakening: A. Rovira i Virgili, Els corrents ideològics de la Renaixença catalana (Barcelona, 1966). As indications of relatively recent research trends: Actes del col·loqui internacional sobre la Renaixença. 18-22 de desembre de 1984. II (Barcelona, 1993); La Renaixença. Cicle de conferències fet a la Institució cultural del CIC de Terrassa, curs 1982/1983 (Barcelona, 1986).


47 See the introduction to volume 1 in P. Vilar, La Catalogne dans la Espagne moderne (Paris, 1962).

48 See the classic statement, after World War I, by journalist W. Lippmann, Public opinion (1922) [accessed 15/3/2013].

50 In general terms, see the essay by M. Burleigh, *Earthly powers. The clash of religion and politics in Europe, from the French Revolution to the Great War* (New York, 2005).

51 J.S. Pons, *La littérature catalane en Roussillon au XVIIe et au XVIIIe siècle* (Toulouse - Paris, 1929). Pons points to the considerable use of Castillian instead of Catalan before the French take-over (see chap. 1).

52 L. Roura, *Guerra Gran a la ratlla de Franca* (Barcelona, 1993).


Fort the direct impact of Labrousse in translation, see E. Labrousse, *Fluctuaciones económicas e historia social* (Madrid, 1962).


66 J. Caro Baroja, El laberinto vasco (San Sebastián, 1984).

67 J. Alvarez Junco, Mater Dolorosa. La idea de España en el siglo XIX (Madrid, 2002).


70 E. Sapir, Language. An introduction to the study of speech (New York, 1921); B. Lee Whorf, Language, thought, and reality. Selected writings, ed. John B. Carroll (Cambridge, 1956). The so-called ‘Sapir-Whorf thesis’ has become the basis of a considerable production in nationalist sociolinguistics, in large measure through the diffusion given to this formulation by the Valencian Lluis V. Aracil; see: L.V. Aracil, Papers de sociolingüística, ed. Enric Montaner (Barcelona, 1982). Thus, a conceptual anthropological interpretation – the idea that a given language colours or greatly defines the life and/or world view of those who share it – to an explicit political demand, expressed literally as the slogan insisting on ‘the Right to live in Catalan’. For the general contextualisation abroad of current sociolinguistic discourse among Catalan nationalists, rather oriented towards what may be termed ‘catastrophism’ in recent years, see: L.A. Grenoble & L.J. Whaley (eds.), Endangered languages. Language loss and community response (Cambridge, 1998); D. Nettle & S. Romaine, Vanishing voices. The extinction of the world’s languages (New York, 2000).


On Occitania, see works by authors in close connection to Catalanist preoccupations: A. Armengaud & R. Lafont (eds.), Histoire d’Occitanie (Paris, 1979); R. Lafont, La revendication occitane (Paris, 1974); R. Lafont & C. Anatole, Història de la literatura occitania (Barcelona, 1973) 2 vol.


G. Orwell, Homage to Catalonia (Boston, [1938] 1955). This work can be contrasted with the similarly emotional book by the Liverpool University Hispanist, which is aimed in another ideological direction: E. Allison Peers, Catalonia infelix (London, 1937).


Pujolism, as a political and cultural phenomenon, has not received the attention that it deserves, not the least for the reason that the Pujol government was, during its twenty-three years in office, quite thorough in avoiding analytic discussion of any kind, except in the terms which preferably excluded any criticism. For a recent overall portrait, see F. Martínez & J. Oliveres, *Jordi Pujol. En nom de Catalunya* (Barcelona, 2005).


There is little solid sociology produced under such circumstances. For the weight of Marxism, see, as an example: S. Giner, *The social structure of Catalonia* (Sheffield, 1984).


The closest Vicens came to commenting on Catalan nationalism is his highly (if latently) political essay on Catalonia: J. Vicens i Vives, *Notícia de Catalunya* (Barcelona, 1954). See also his *Els catalans en el segle XIX* (Barcelona,1958).

The later Spanish translation has the advantage of being corrected, after the bitter debate set off by the first edition in Catalan: J. Solé Tura, *Catalanismo y revolución burguesa* (Madrid, 1970).

For example J. Llorens, *Obrerisme i catalanisme (1875-1931)* (Barcelona, 1992).


On queer theory, see: J. Sáez, *Teoría queer y psicolanálisis* (Madrid, 2004). On postcolonial interpretation: J. McLeod, *Beginning postcolonialism* (Manchester, 2000). In a sense, the excellent work of Fradera serves as a clear indication of just how much could be gained by a lucid application of such a focus (which, it should be added, he clearly preceded): J.M. Fradera, *Gobernar colonias* (Barcelona, 1999); J.M. Fradera, *Indústria i mercat. Les bases comercials de la indústria catalana moderna (1814-1845)* (Barcelona, 1987).
96 J.M. Ainaud de Lasarte e.a., *Cultura catalana i franquisme. Societat civil i resistència cultural a Catalunya* (Barcelona, 2002).

